In the 25 years since I wrote this the advances in state of the literature is nothing short of phenomenal. I will eventually revisit this work to bring it up to date. However, I believe that overall - the thesis still stands up, and I thought I would share it.
Preface – Personal Foundations
In many ways the thoughts
and views reflected in this work represent a personal odyssey that has involved
more than the acquisition of objective intellectual understanding. Intricately
embodied in this endeavour has been a striving for emotional and psychological
growth and development. It can be said that the nature of the topic makes it
impossible to separate oneself as a dispassionate observer whose subject matter
has no bearing or influence on the rest of one's life or conduct. The
intertwining of observer and subject matter can have some positive benefit in
that the considerations and consequences of findings may more easily be
practically grounded. However, for beneficial results to be derived from such a
complex area of study the observer is required to confront and acknowledge the
belief and value systems constituting the observational base.
The introduction of one
sort of bias or another into one's work cannot be avoided. The best precaution
is to make as explicit as possible the potential sources of bias. With this in
mind it may be important to elaborate some of the personal background pertinent
to the present study.
Among the idiosyncrasies
of my own upbringing was the fact that I was raised by two women – my mother
and her mother (my grandmother). Each woman played different roles in a unique
sort of family structure and each taught me different things. It was from my
grandmother that I learned how to use carpentry tools, yet neither woman went
out of their way to ensure I knew how to cook or launder. In retrospect, I am
able to discern some behaviour patterns exhibited by both women that may have
been due to the difficulties they faced as women having to be independent in a
society in which independent women were not the norm. In the process of growing
up I was aware of inequality in the hierarchy of social stratification, but not
especially of the inequality of women. In fact many of the images of competence
that I continue to carry are of these two significant models of independence.
As an adult I became
conscious that economic, social, and psychological dynamics were important
factors shaping my experience and ultimately my identity. A fundamental source
of self-consciousness is of course the relating we participate in. The
rudimentary categories of relationship that I was able to initially distinguish
as important were based on distinctions between:
1.
Classes (which included
differences in family structure and dynamics, as well as other socioeconomic
factors);
2.
The different quality of
relations occurring because of the sex of the participants; and
3.
The different statuses of
the participants (for example parent-child or friend-friend).
Becoming cognizant of
different categories of relationship permitted the discernment of relational
patterns, both within and between categories of relationship. The capacity to
discern relational patterns was the primary origin of the motivational
curiosity that served as the background for the present work. Specifically,
what had seemed to be relational patterns unique to the experience of my
parents were apparently being recreated in my own experience despite my best
efforts to ensure the opposite. These "inherited" relational patterns
were initially most evident to me in my own attitudes and expectations of
women. Eventually I became conscious of
corresponding patterns in my attitudes and expectations in other categories of
relationship including those to other men, authority figures, social and
cultural groups other than my own, and to other classes of social situations.
The sort of inheritance
and apparent re-creation of familial relational patterns speak strongly in
favour of those views founded on theories proposing the socially constructed
nature of identity (including gender characteristics). The innumerable
diversity of differences between individuals can be seen as a partial result,
at least, of the inevitably unique histories of every individual. Yet the issue
is not so simple! This point will be assumed as a given throughout this work
and pertinent to every point of view.
Having dedicated
approximately eight years of my early adult life to the exploration and
establishment of alternative life styles and values, I have been able to
experience and observe a good many individual and group efforts to change
traditional patterns of behaviour and expectations. The many challenges,
opportunities and insights that were integral to this period of my life
continue to present themselves, both as a set of resources and an experiential
base to reflect upon. Despite the realization that the transformation of
tradition (in the profound or even radical way that many in my generation hoped
to accomplish) proves impossible, many deep changes have been forthcoming. The
view of the social construction of personality/identity would seem to find much
support in the observations during this period of "social
experiments." However, several areas of experience seemed to tap into
roots that extended beyond the parameters of society and culture. Certainly,
the particular manifestations of our experience as humans are never free from
social or cultural influence. Yet, the source of many experiences may not be
found in cultural determinants, but rather in the transcultural determinants of
the human condition itself.
Chief among the areas of
experience that seems, to this eye, to expose some transcultural aspects of the
human condition, is that area of experiential dynamics concerning sexuality and
reproduction. While many of the dynamics involved in the reproductive process
are necessarily culturally specific, I felt that there were different classes
of existential motivations or decisions initially available to each sex.
However, accepting a transcultural difference in the orientation of the
relational attitudes of each sex does not require an inevitable acceptance of
differences behavioral capacity. Despite differences in perceptual orientation
an assertion that both sexes share a common behavioral repertoire can be well
founded in a general and overriding human capability. Thus, both differences
and similarities can be viewed as having a transcultural base. Culturally
specific manifestations of both similarities and differences depend on many
systemic factors, adaptational systems being only one.
What is more to the
point, are the types of choices available to a person in the midst of an
existential crisis concerning individual purpose and belonging, especially as
they relate to potential reproductive involvement. Perhaps, in more than any
other area of human experience, are the implications relevant to differences
between the sexes more easily discernible. The experiences, both personal and
observed surrounding this issue has been a fundamental factor inspiring the
development of this thesis.
The thesis embraces
several theoretical frameworks, from biological to symbolic. Anthropology is
perhaps the most appropriate discipline within which to carry out this study.
The reach of anthropology, extended through its many sub-disciplines, is able to
grasp the pertinent theoretical frameworks as well as to provide a perspective
based on cross-cultural knowledge.
Chapter One – Epistemological Frameworks
It is
increasingly clear that our cultural values have been undermined, so that even
among the masses, and especially among today's youth, there are individuals who
are seeking, not so much the destruction of the old, as something new on which
to build. And because the destruction has been so widespread and has gone so
deep, this new foundation must be located in the depths in the most natural,
the most primordial, most universally human core of existence.
Marie-Louise von Franz, (1975)
Marie-Louise von Franz, (1975)
The development of a comprehensive understanding of human behaviour is rife with problems, especially if such an understanding remains based solely on personal experience. However, the other side of the coin is the problematic of objective knowledge. The subjective-objective basis of knowledge has been a fundamental issue in the controversy (and confusion) concerning sex and gender. On one hand there is the much substantiated claim that our language (and our social structure) privileges the male, notably in the guise of an objective and universal science. On the other hand, the recognition of subjective experience such as the "problem with no name" (Friedan 1963), made easier through the practice of consciousness raising groups, has played a significant role in the contemporary development of the feminist movement. The continuing feminist challenge to the prevailing social and scientific paradigm has contributed a great deal to the formulation of a more adequate conception of human nature. However, a number of problems remain. The purpose of this study will be to elaborate a useful theoretical frame within which some aspects of the study of sex differences and similarities and the social construction of gender can be carried out. The proposed frame will incorporate developmental, evolutionary, historical, culturally specific and transcultural observations and perspectives. The frame will aim to avoid the fallacy of the bifurcation of nature by stressing a mind-body unity that acknowledges sex-specific differences within a context of an overwhelming similarity of behavioral potential among individuals of our species. Naturally, the caution against the reification of theory applies to this thesis.
A relatively well
accepted view asserts that perception is contingent on some sort of
figure-ground relationship. Accepting this as a proposition, it is then
possible that the perception of individual differences as 'figure' presupposes
a 'ground' of overriding similarities. For example, the not uncommon experience
that individuals belonging to an unfamiliar race (or perhaps family) "all
look alike". Only after the perceiver has become familiar with the overall
similarities of the particular group does a host of subtle and not so subtle
individual differences emerge to perception. Thus, a factor contributing to the
perception of individuality (in behaviour and development) is a contextual
"ground" of similarities. In fact we may be able partially to define
"culture" as the determiner of the contextual "ground" of
similarities (behavioral and otherwise) out of which emerges individualities.
Other factors would include the spectrum of norms that provide the parameters
of possible differences.
Fundamental to this study
is the view that reality is essentially process and pattern (of organizing
information, and information in turn being "news of difference")
(Bateson, 1979). To this end some of the perspectives of C.G. Jung, G. Bateson,
C. Laughlin et al, E. Count, Varela & Maturana, systems theory and others
have been instrumental and are integrated in the construction of our
theoretical frame.
Perhaps a central source
of problems lies in what Gregory Bateson (1972) has termed pathologies of
epistemology, which includes the fallacy of purposive or objective thinking.
The consequence of purposive thinking, as a methodology for problem solving, is
its linearity of focus almost guarantees the development of
"side-effects". The potential of purposive thought to generate
certain types of misunderstanding may be compounded by the Indo-European
languages. While a full examination of the influence of language is not within
the scope or intent of this work, a brief elaboration is appropriate and
useful.
The nominalization of
processes, that is the extended reliance of our language on nouns, tempts us
into the "naturalization" of the fallacy of misplaced concreteness.
For example, we often speak of wanting a good or better relationship. While we
implicitly understand that "a relationship" as such does not exist in
the same way that a "thing" does, we generally act as if the
"relationship" were a "thing." We use the noun
"relationship" to describe succinctly the type or types of relating
that are actively being maintained.
However, when a relational problem is framed as "the relationship
is not satisfying" then an obvious solution is to "get out of, or
leave the relationship" as if it were a thing. Such a solution seems to be
obvious and straightforward, centering the problem objectively – that is
without a subject. However, when a relational problem is framed as "the
way I'm relating is not satisfying" then the subsequent solutions become
focused on the behaviour of the subject, that is, on changing the way I relate.
While both solutions may ultimately appear to be identical, the process by
which the solution was arrived at, through the later approach and the potential
for alternatives contained therein seems to hold, by far, more choice and
flexibility.
It is very difficult, as
a natural speaker of English and French without fluency in any other language,
to conceive of speaking or thinking without the use of nouns. Nouns appear to
have played a very useful role as conceptual tools in the development of the
knowledge systems that dominate our culture. Despite the aim of maintaining a
systemic approach it will be impossible to avoid the nominalization inherent in
the language.
No aspect or process is
free of being "nominally reified". It is especially important to
remember this when we are conceptually framing living systems. In the social
sciences much confusion has been created through the nominalization of living
processes. For instance, there is the conceptual trap in thinking of the
evolution of individual traits or characteristics. This type of conceptualizing
often leads to an understanding of discrete parts rather than functioning
wholes. The idea of traits has been applied
to a range of theories, from the evolution of species to the development of
personality, (including of course notions of gender, masculinity and
femininity, etc.). It is the aim of this work to avoid these sorts of
conceptual problems. Toward this end, Count's (1973) view that it is systems
and not traits (nominalized processes or systems of processes) which evolve,
will be adopted.
Another major source of
confusion in the thinking concerning sex and gender (and perhaps the social
sciences in general) is the lack of consideration of the complex levels in the
nature of living experience. If we assume that human experience is
multi-leveled we can proceed to make some distinctions between certain of these
levels. A logical place to begin in making distinctions between different
levels is by defining the terms sex, gender, and sexuality, since I believe
they are often erroneously used interchangeably.
In higher life forms only
two sexes exist. In virtually all vertebrates and mammals the life cycle can be
divided into two phases; a reproductive and a non-reproductive phase. Generally
speaking sex becomes a significant determiner of behaviour only during the
reproductive phase (Count 1973). On this level, sex functions to ensure the
survival of the species by providing the mechanism for reproduction and
evolutionary adaptation. The neurostructures responsible for the development
and functioning of anatomical or bio-physiological sexual dimorphism are
complemented by neurostructures concerned with the individual's survival and
existence (this will be expanded upon in chapter two). Although the picture is
more complicated at the human level (as will be elaborated in the next chapter)
the definition of sex as stated in the above holds true.
Gender as a term appears
not to be so clear cut, and only a tentative definition is offered. Genders
emerge as socially constructed categories which in turn consist of combinations
of components of behaviour that are perceived as isomorphic or consistent with
the sex-specific developmental and organizational patterns. While some
developmental and organizational patterns are sex-specific, it must be stressed
that gender categories do not depend on one's sex as much as on one's behaviour
and sometimes status (for instance, in some cultures infants and the elderly
are referred to as "its" (Cove 1987 personal communication)).
Sexuality or
"polymorphous pleasure"[1] is both problem and
solution embodied in the evolutionary experiment represented by the human
species. Sexuality may be briefly defined as the "freeing of the libido"
made possible by the evolution of the menstrual cycle and the more encompassing
homeomorphogenetic relation between body morphology and the hierarchically
organized structures of the brain and nervous system. Sexuality becomes more
particularly a function concerning the individual rather than the species. A
more complete articulation of the nature of human sexuality will be presented
in the next chapter. Thus far, our definitions permit us to posit that from two
sexes are born the potential for multiple gender categories and innumerable
sexualities or varieties of sexual behaviour.
Another fundamental
concern, central to an understanding of the unity and distinctiveness of levels
within living systems, as well as to proponents of theories of the socially
constructed nature of gender, is how the subject is conceptualized. A host of
different psychological perspectives acknowledge, in one way or another, the
myth of the "unitary, rational, homunculus" (Henriques, Holloway, et
al, 1984). This study's perspective takes as given that the socially
constructed nature of the subject (as a personality) is incontrovertible.
However, a major problem remains. If the subject is neither unitary, nor
rational, then upon what do we hang the notion of the individual? It may be
that the concept of 'the individual', which we in our culture understand to be
a ubiquitous reality, can itself be a social construction.
Berman (1984) speaks of
the emergence of an "objective consciousness" sometime between the
1300's and 1500's and established throughout the West in the 1700's. Today, our
culture considers objective consciousness to be so much the natural order of
things that any other form of consciousness is thought of as an altered state
of consciousness. Of course a cultural position that considers all but
'objective consciousness' an 'altered state' can in turn be seen as oriented
toward a "monophasic consciousness" (Laughlin 1978, 1983). Be that as
it may, what may be important to the conceptualization of the individual is the
objectification of experience. The observer in seeing/creating objects easily
habituates the perception of a sort of continuity-in-autonomy as a singular,
unitary identity/ego/individuality. Extended to a more inclusive level this
perception of a continuity-in-autonomy can lead some to the experience of the
Transcendental Ego.
The theoretical view of
living systems (distinguishable from other systems by their apparent autonomy)
developed by Maturana and Varela (1980, also Varela, 1979) serves as a useful
epistemological foundation. Upon this perspective we can not only
"hang" the phenomenology of a unitary subject, but also certain
aspects of the phenomenologies concerned with different levels at which living
systems function, (i.e. the ecology as a whole, a particular species,
individual females or males etc.). This theoretical framework is also important
in that it elaborates a relationship between phenomenological, biological and
ontological processes of an organism without using the dualism that so often separates
mind from body. The distinction between behavioral capacities and
phenomenological/physical unities is vital if we are to achieve a useful
understanding of sex similarities and differences. Furthermore, the
establishment of an epistemological foundation out of which gender is socially
constructed depends on a framework that can distinguish between behavioral
capacities and bio-neuro-physiologically linked phenomenologies if we are to
respect sex differences without prescribing behaviors that are confining or
inappropriate.
A brief reiteration of
their views concerning living systems may be appropriate at this point.
Maturana and Varela (1980) in speaking of the development of their work state:
What
was ...fundamental was the discovery that one had to close off the nervous
system to account for its operation, and that perception should not be viewed
as a grasping of an external reality, but rather as the specification of one,
because no distinction was possible between perception and hallucination in the
operation of the nervous system as a closed network (Maturana and Varela,
1980:XV).
A
cognitive system is a system whose organization defines a domain of
interactions in which it can act with relevance to the maintenance of itself,
and the process of cognition is the actual (inductive) acting or behaving in
this domain (Maturana and Varela 1980:13).
Thus a cognitive system
is a living system and living and cognition are the same process. This is true
of all organisms whether they have a nervous system or not. The nervous system
does not create cognition but expands the cognitive domain by making
interactions with pure relations possible (Maturana and Varela 1980:13).
However, this brief
presentation of a theory of cognitive systems is incomplete without the
encompassing theory of living systems that has been developed by the same
authors. The importance and significance of the implications of their
perspective, for this work and the social sciences as a whole, should not be
measured by the brevity of the following synopsis.
Maturana and Varela
(1980:48) offer a summary of a concept of the organization of living systems in
the following:
The
living organization is a circular organization which secures the production or
maintenance of the components that specify it in such a manner that the product
of their functioning is the very same organization that produces them.
A living system is thus a homeostatic one. Such a system holds its own organization as a variable that is maintained constant, through the production and functioning of the components that specify it (as a system). Its own organization defines itself as a unit of interactions. Living systems then, are a subclass of circular and homeostatic systems (Maturana and Varela 1980:48).
However, the apparent
struggle for conciseness in the above definition of the self-referential
circular organization of living systems, as well as the potential for
misunderstanding involved in using a language developed to frame other
conceptual systems, led the authors to the realization that coining a more
specific term would be necessary. Their
choice was the term "autopoiesis" from the Greek auto = self, and
poiesis = to produce, that is self-producing. Thus:
An
autopoietic system is organized (defined as a unity) as a network of processes
of production (transformation and destruction) of components that produces the
components that: (1) through their interactions and transformations
continuously regenerate and realize the network of processes (relations) that
produced them: and (2) constitute it ... as a concrete unity in the space in
which they exist by specifying the topological domain of its realization as
such a network. (Varela, 1979:13).
Perhaps the
self-referential circularity of an autopoietic identity is most succinctly
framed by Popeye's statement, "I am what I am that I am what I am."
Autopoietic systems can
be further defined as autonomous. As self-producing systems they subordinate
all changes to the maintenance of their organization, no matter how profoundly
they may otherwise be transformed in the process. Furthermore, autopoietic
system can be said to have individuality. Holding its organization as an
invariant through its continuous production, an identity is actively maintained
which is independent of its interactions with an observer (Maturana and Varela
1980:80).
Accepting the definition
of autopoietic systems, we have a substantial transcultural base upon which the
phenomenology of a unitary (if not rational) "homunculus" can be
placed. Additionally, this base permits us to elaborate a
phenomenology/cognition that is relevant to an autonomous identity yet which is
dependent on a particular structure and organization. More significantly, by
linking structure and ontology with a consequent phenomenology, the theory of
autopoiesis is a particularly appropriate framework with which to understand
each sex individually as well as an interactional mutualism of one species. We
will argue that the structural and ontological differences between each sex are
exemplified in corresponding patterns of perceptions and cognitions.
As unlimited in content
or form that the phenomenology of a living system can be, the authors (Maturana
and Varela 1980:97) do note some stipulations.
Included in these concerns are:
- Since autopoietic organization defines the system as a unity, the implication is that the phenomenology of the system is totally subordinated to the maintenance of its unity.
- A particular unity defines the domain of its phenomenology. However the specific structure constituting the unity defines the kind of phenomenology that is generated in that domain. That is the particular form adopted by the phenomenology of each autopoietic unity depends on the particular way in which its autopoiesis is realized.
- Finally, all biological phenomenology is determined and realized through individual autopoietic unities and consists of all the paths of transformations that homeostatic systems undergo, singly or in groups, in the process of maintaining their defining individual relations constant.
In making the point that
individual phenomenology is determined and realized by all the paths of
transformation undergone by an autopoietic system (in biological form) these
authors are paving an introduction to an understanding of the significance of
ontogeny. However, before we can pursue the topic of ontogeny further one more
vital consideration regarding the phenomenology of autopoietic systems needs to
be discussed.
The circularity of the
autopoietic system has very important implications for an understanding of its
phenomenology. More specifically the nervous system interacts only with
relations that are necessarily mediated by physical interaction. The objects seen by an animal are not
determined by the quantity of light absorbed, but rather by the relations that
hold between the receptor induced states of activity within the retina. The
types of relations that are possible are determined by the connectivity of the various
types of cells involved. Therefore, "the nervous system defines through
the relative weights of the patterns of interactions of its various components,
both innate and acquired through experience, which relations will modify it at
any given interaction" (Maturana and Varela, 1980:2). In general, the
organization and structure of an autopoietic system define in it, a bias, a
point of view or perspective from within which it interacts, by determining at
any instant the possible relations accessible to or generated by its nervous
system. By outlining some of the major structural and ontological differences
unique to each sex we will present the corresponding biases, or perspectives.
Additionally, organisms
exist which include as a subset of their possible interactions, interactions
with their own internal states (resultant from external and internal
interactions) as if these were independent entities. On this basis we can
understand the impossibility of determining perception from hallucination in
the operation of the nervous system as a closed network. An apparent paradox
emerges as an organism can include their own cognitive domain within their
cognitive domain (Maturana and Varela 1980:13). However, this may be the basis
of the occurrence of such phenomena as "symbolic penetration"
(Webber, 1980; Webber and Laughlin, 1979) which in turn can serve as a
methodology for the development (cultural or otherwise) of more comprehensive
and complex cognized environments and perceptual filters.
The phenomenology of the
nervous system is exclusively that of the changes of state of a closed neuronal
network such that for it there is no inside or outside. The specification of
boundaries making possible the distinction between internal and external
origins of changes of state of the nervous system can only be made by an
observer beholding an organism as a unity. Thus, state changes of the nervous
system can only originate internally or externally in respect to the domain of
interactions of the organism as a unity. Therefore, "the history of the
causes of the changes of state of the nervous system lies in a different
phenomenological domain than the changes of state themselves" (Maturana
and Varela 1980:128).
Given that all states of
the nervous system are internal states and that in its process of
transformation the nervous system is unable to make distinctions between
internally and externally generated changes, then it is equally likely to
couple its history of transformations to the history of its internally and/or externally
determined state changes. "Thus the transformations that the nervous
system undergoes during its operation are a constitutive part of its
ambience" (Maturana and Varela 1980:131).
The position taken in
this paper relies on the significance of development as a lifelong process.
More accurately it posits that, despite individual differences and similarities
and the assumption that individuals of the human species are in a general sense
capable of exhibiting the entire spectrum of behaviour available to the species
as a whole, there remain sex-specific developmental patterns responsible for
correspondingly different perceptual orientations. Ontogeny then, "is the
history of the structural transformation of a unity. Accordingly, the ontogeny
of a living system is the history of maintenance of its identity through
continuous autopoiesis in the physical space" (Maturana and Varela
1980:98).
More significantly, the
cognitive domain of any autopoietic system is relative to the specific manner
in which its autopoiesis is realized. Knowledge (as descriptive conduct) is
then to be considered as relative to the knower's cognitive domain. The
knowledge of an organism (its conduct repertoire) changes as the manner in
which its autopoiesis is realized during the ontogeny, also changes. Therefore:
…knowledge,
then is necessarily always a reflection of the ontogeny of the knower because
ontogeny as a process of continuous structural change without loss of
autopoiesis is a process of continuous specification of the behavioral capacity
of the organism, and, hence, of its actual domain of interactions (Maturana and
Varela 1980:119).
The consequence of this view is that absolute knowledge is not possible and the validation of all possible relative knowledge is achieved through successful autopoiesis (Maturana and Varela 1980:119). The idea important to note is that ontogeny can occur only because of the maintenance of identity throughout continuous autopoiesis, and that the knowledge of the knower is dependent on the knower's ontogeny.
Another issue fundamental
to the foundation of the ideas being developed in this work concerns the bridge
between the behavioral parameters circumscribing the individual and those
circumscribing the species. Without using such problematic notions as
instincts, etc. Maturana and Varela (1980:109) offer their conceptual bridge in
the following:
An
autopoietic system whose autopoiesis entails the autopoiesis of the coupled
autopoietic unities which realize it, is an autopoietic system of a higher
order.
When an autopoietic
system of this sort of higher order occurs, the way in which the component
autopoietic systems realize their own autopoiesis becomes subordinated to the
maintenance of the autopoiesis of the higher order (composite) autopoietic
unity (Maturana and Varela 1980:110). The higher order autopoietic unity is
defined topologically through the coupling of component autopoietic unities. In
reference to evolution, the same sort of relations, hold between component and
composite autopoietic unities. The authors state:
If the
higher order autopoietic system undergoes self-reproduction (through the
self-reproduction of one of its component autopoietic unities or otherwise), an
evolutionary process begins in which the evolution of the manner of realization
of the component autopoietic systems is necessarily subordinated to the
evolution of the manner of realization of the composite unity (Maturana and
Varela 1980:111).
The conceptualization of autopoietic systems as living unitary systems, which can in turn be composed of, or be a component of autopoietic systems of different orders, sets a frame within which both the individual and the species can be viewed and described in equal terms. However, the hierarchy of different orders of autopoietic systems places certain constraints on the priorities that can be established within each of these different orders of autopoietic systems. Stated succinctly it is only after becoming constituted as an autopoietic unity (individual) that reproduction can take place as a biological phenomenon (Maturana and Varela 1980:97). It follows that the human species must therefore be an autopoietic unity and that individual males and females are composite autopoietic unities. In turn, the realization of the autopoiesis of females and males is subordinated to the maintenance of the autopoiesis of the species. We can discern two important consequences from this view:
- Although male and female may contribute equally in the maintenance of the autopoiesis of the species they would logically contribute differently (or two sexes would be redundant);
- From the perspective of an individual, the perceptual/cognitive experience of this species serving dimorphism would likely involve certain aspects of a transpersonal phenomenology.
Phenomenologically
the linguistic domain and the domain of autopoiesis are different domains, and
although one generates the elements of the other, they do not intersect.
Although the model of
autopoiesis is an extremely useful conceptual tool or frame of reference with
which to view living organizations, care must be taken to understand that the
particular applications presented in this study requires a good deal of
simplification. In the following chapters the shifts to conceptions of
different orders of autopoietic systems do not account for all of the
exponential increases in the complexity that higher orders of autopoietic
organization incur.
There are other
theoretical frameworks useful to the perspective taken in this project, which
will be referred to throughout the work. Time, however, does not permit as full
an elaboration of each theoretical frame as has been given to the theory of
autopoiesis.
The controversy
concerning sex differences has essentially been a special case of the more
encompassing nature-nurture dilemma. There has always been a powerful current
of biological determinism in the thinking on human behaviour (Bleier, 1984:5).
Perhaps it may be that the kind of functionalism which attempted to ground
behavioral prescriptions upon a biological base fostered a reaction stressing a
proportionately greater emphasis on the social-construction of gender. Either
of these types of apparently one-sided approaches must be avoided.
In this regard,
autopoiesis is a powerful analytical tool by which understanding and
perspective of different orders of self-producing and reproducing living
systems can be achieved. Furthermore, autopoiesis recognizes the significance
of both hierarchical ordering and complex associative networks in the
contextual circularity of the organization and structure of a living system.
The profound beauty of autopoietic conceptualization is that it offers an
epistemology that can encompass both male and female perceptual and cognitive
orientations (as exemplified in the first section of chapter four). By
extension, the conception of institutions or bureaucracies as autopoietic
systems would require that their management, development and evolution be
structured and organized in terms of both networks and hierarchies.
This work takes as given,
that biologically based behavioral prescriptions are untenable. An approach
that puts greater emphasis on the social construction of gender implies that
social change can be enacted through the motivation of a collective will to do
so. However, it may also exacerbate the problem in that it may tempt and even
foster the projection of feelings of frustration, victimization, blaming and
anger, etc. should social change not be as readily forthcoming as
anticipated. Furthermore an exclusively
social constructionist approach may tend to obfuscate the complex involvement,
which biological differences (and similarities) may have, in the construction
of the social parameters out of which gender categories are constituted.
Besides the limitations already noted, there remains the problem of developing
a theoretical understanding optimising the potential for developing and
instituting more appropriate social policies and structures. Thus the problem
centers on how to acknowledge both the influence of biological referents of the
differences between the sexes and the equality of the repertoire of behavioral
potential of both sexes.
A case will be made
presenting:
- Gender as a social phenomenology constituted out of a symbolic template derived from a species-serving sex dimorphism;
- A distinction between the neural (or autopoietic) structures of the species and the individual, enables the acknowledgement of biologically based sex-specific perceptual filters and consequent cognitive orientations in addition to the simultaneous potential for the integration of differing orientations.
Chapter Two – Evolutionary Context: The Human
Species as a Being and Becoming
A prerequisite to
theorizing human experience is the outlining of the context within which that
experience is shaped. Fundamental to most of the thinking on the human species
is the elaboration of how and why humans are different from all other forms of
life on earth. Evolutionary theory has made much of traits considered uniquely
human such as the opposable thumb, an erect posture, the neocortex, speech, and
symbol and tool making, etc. However, it has already been noted that evolution
conceptualized in terms of morphological traits is neither accurate nor
generally useful. Evolution is more comprehensively conceived with the view
that it is systems which make novel adjustments rather than traits which
evolve. By elaborating the evolution of the human species, in terms of the
evolution of the complex interrelated systems that constitute the species, we
can establish a metacontext within which the multileveled functionings of human
sexual dimorphism can be understood.
To visualise the
evolution of a complex system is perhaps not possible without the right set of
conceptual tools. Theorizing in terms of traits and linear causal models
inevitably leads to the sorts of dilemmas whereby concern is focused on the
determination of origins – which comes first the chicken or the egg? Of course
the chicken and the egg are one and the same autopoeitic entity at different
stages of ontological transformation. The dilemma is a false one. What emerges is a novel system, not a new
thing. Autopoietic systems cannot become established in a gradual process,
because it is defined as a system, that is, as a topological unity, by its very
organization. A system is an autopoietic (living) one or it is not. Structural
changes can occur in response to environmental perturbations, but such changes
must be subordinated to the maintenance of the system's identity as an
organization.
An important conceptual
tool has been offered by Laughlin (1986:134135) in the explanatory causal
principle of homeomorphogenesis. This principle refers to an inter-causal
isomorphism between two or more changing subsystems within the same system.
While total isomorphism is rare in the world, a partial isomorphism functions
in a way where set A can be mapped onto set B but not vice versa. The
correspondences are causally linked but they are not the same. In a sense,
homeomorphogenesis names the process by which a living system maintains the
homeostasis of its 'organization' through the production and functioning of its
components (including its own organization as variable or component which must
also be maintained constant), while undergoing structural changes or
transformations. Since autopoiesis implies that all change in such a system is
subordinated to the maintenance of the organization which defines it as a
unity, then a change in one component may necessitate relatively isomorphic
accommodations in other components as well as in the network of productions of
components. Homeomorphogenesis is the process by which novelty in one aspect of
a living system, orders via the system's organizational networks, isomorphic
changes in other parts or subsystems.
The understanding of
evolution posited in this chapter relies heavily though not exclusively on the
principle of homeomorphogenesis. A case will be made to show that the human
neurological capacity for symbolopoesis (the symbol making process understood
as a neuropsychological phenomenon) (Count, 1973:219) is isomorphic with the
relational potential embodied in the unique sexual dimorphism of humans. More
specifically we will concentrate on the relational potential made possible by
the evolution of the human menstrual cycle and some corresponding anatomical
features (systems).
Two other theorists figure
prominently in this chapter, Earl Count and A.N. Whitehead. The initial
difficulty in trying to integrate different thinkers lies in the merging of
each thinker's language and sphere of interest into one framework. However, the
fundamentals of autopoiesis are consistent with the work of Laughlin, Count,
and Whitehead. This chapter will primarily utilize the perspective and language
developed by Count (1973) as his work lends itself particularly well to the
description of the contextual level that this chapter aims to elaborate.
Count (1973:214) asserts
that no structure has significance without a functional context. Thus, the
total behavioral architecture of an organism (termed by Count as its biogram)
must be located within an evolutionary and ecological context in order to be
comprehensively understood. One context, within which the evolution of specific
biograms can be located, has been delineated by A.N. Whitehead (1929).
Whitehead posits that organic (negentropic) processes cannot be understood without
some sort of implicit teleological 'principle' guiding these systems toward the
methodologies enabling them "to live, to live well, and to live
better." Furthermore, the 'function of reason' (Whitehead 1929) is
presupposed to be applicable to all orders of systems (organic and inorganic).
This thesis accepts Whitehead's notion to be operative in the shaping of
successful evolutionary trends, whatever the order or level of the evolving
system.
It may seem that the
function of reason is incompatible with the Darwinian position on natural
selection as well as Maturana and Valera's (1980 see also Valera 1979:70) view
that the definition of living systems does not necessitate teleological
notions. However, the explanatory principles of natural selection and the
function of reason may be seen as mirror images reflecting different
perspectives. Ultimately, the products of natural selection can be found to be
indistinguishable from the results of the function of reason (as put forth by
Whitehead, 1929).
Count (1973:221) grounds
his emphasis of context by asserting that:
…the
minimum completely viable universe of discourse (unit of survival) is that of
organism-within-environment; anything less is an arbitrary abstraction which is
useful only temporarily, and intolerable beyond some point.
The compatibility of Count's position with autopoiesis is maintained when we understand that the organism-as-system is a subsystem or moiety of the coupling "organism-environment" which in turn can refer to different orders of autopoietic systems, i.e. "organism vs. species" and "species vs ecology."
It is possible to refine
the concept of organism-in-environment in terms that are appropriate to the
working of species as an autopoietic system consisting of two homeomorphogenically
related component autopoietic systems: "male" and "female."
The adjustment occurring at the juncture of two generations is greater than
that of an organism to a mere environment. Rather it is two organisms
expressing a mutualism (Count, 1973:43). On the level of phylogeny,
reproductive modifications must be simultaneous and complementary in both
sexes. What is changing, is a system (the structure but not the organization of
an autopoietic system) and not just one type of body form (Count 1973:45).
Count's concept of
species biograms can also be consistent with the notion that an autopoietic
system's phenomenology is dependent upon its structure. More specifically,
Count (1973:221), holds that living systems organize an Umwelt
through the execution of ontogenic choices. He maintains (1973:143), that an
organism's life mode is representative of the externalised functionings of its
morphology, the life mode evolving as a feature of the total morphologic
evolution. Organisms possess a total behavioral (biogram) as well as a total
physical architecture (Count 1973:72).
The elaboration of a
biogram begins with a functional distinction between those processes concerned
with the wellbeing of the individual and those life processes by which the
individual propagates its kind (Count 1973:15). The vertebrate biogram can be
viewed as being primarily engineered on a diphasic basis: a phase of
reproductive quiescence and a phase of reproductive activity. Each phase takes
place under a distinct endocrine or hormonal presidency activated by innate
neuro-psychic mechanisms and marked by peculiar behavioral patterns. A
migration that is always 'psychological' if not always physical takes place for
each phase. The phases persist regardless of the gregariousness or the solitariness
of the life habits of the individual (Count 1973:167).
Count (1973:30) offered
the generalization that specialized adaptations of an animal's life mode are
effected during the non-reproductive phase. Only after the non-reproductive
life mode has been remodeled, is the reproductive life mode brought into the
new adjustment. In behavioral terms it would seem that the non-reproductive
phase of the vertebrate biogram is the most flexible. In fact very little has
been studied about this phase, for instance it is not known whether: A) the
intra-sex hierarchies, or B) in how far inter-sex dominances, persist.
Frequently it is only during this phase that a flock will admit strangers into
its membership, as the reproductive phase sees a heightened individualism
(Count, 1973:567). During the reproductive phase the hitherto homomorphous
society (in terms of its behaviour) develops sex moieties; while the passing of
the phase witnesses the recession of this social dimorphism. Thus a realignment
of social vectors and tensors, but not a cancellation, is enacted (Count,
1973:21). Animals continue to have phase specific foci of interests such that
when one set is active the other tends to be inhibited, i.e. feeding and
copulation do not occur simultaneously (Count, 1973:80).
While evolutionary
exploration may occur in the non-reproductive phase, it may be that significant
evolutionary leaps only become embodied when adaptations are integrated into
the reproductive phase. An example may be the shift from oviparity to viviparity,
and the subsequent change of "the autonomous male embryo with estrogenic
induction of females into the autonomous female embryo with androgenic
induction of males" (Sherfey, 1973:41). These types of reproductive phase
changes represent radically different relations between the biogram environment
mutualisms.
It is now possible to
move the discussion to a consideration of the possible nature of the
evolutionary question to which the human biogram is the answer. Given that the
evolutionary 'unit-of-survival' is the organism-in-environment mutualism, then
the onset of the reproductive phase is a question of timing the optimum
environment-organism conditions in appropriate synchronous cycles. For example,
in spring the exposure to increased amounts of light helps to 'warn' the
organism via the pituitary gland which then stimulates the reproductive systems
into assuming phasic dominance. In higher animals the instinctive patterns of
the reproductive phase become triggered into action by warning mechanisms rather
than by tissue hungers (Count 1973:70)[2]. Specific environmental
contingencies (for instance increases in sunlight during spring) warn organisms
into and through all the biogrammatic phases. However, the reproductive phase
is proportionately more reliant on environmental cycles as activational
contexts synchronizing phasic processes. The organism is generally freer to
"boldly go" to "seek new frontiers" during the phase of
reproductive quiescence.
During the reproductive
phase an organism attaches its organizational homeostasis and develops a
locative ego involvement with a particular "territory" and which
lasts only as long as the endocrine tonus does (Count 1973:45). Among higher
animals there is an increasing generality in their dependence on environmental
contexts to synchronize the processes defining the reproductive phase. The
organization of an organism and its Umwelt is accomplished at
least partly by a process of discrimination of a self-space and an alien space.
In terms of autopoiesis we can understand the discrimination of self-space to
be inseparable from the maintenance of the organization defining its unity/identity.
Alien space is perhaps more likely not to be as clear-cut a category. There is
no specification in an autopoietic organization of what it is not. The
territorialism of most animals may not be so much a differentiation of what is
alien as much as a maintenance of the integrity of the particular identity[3].
Although Count (1973:251)
states that alien space is further differentiated as an animal develops a
territorialism of a "home" and a "range", it may be more
accurate to define "home" and "range" as differentiations
of the self-space since the organism adapts the physical spot to itself, as
much as the converse. Alien space is exterior to the boundary of that
self-identity. Count (1973:251) comments, "In fact, more than food an
animal needs a focus of self-orientation. It is commonly termed 'security' by
which usually is meant the emotional state of the animal that results from
establishing a certain set of homeostatic conditions. "While a greater
degree of flexibility attains as we move up the evolutionary ladder, the need
to maintain autopoietic integrity – identity, is consistent with the
establishment of sets of homeostatic conditions or more accurately, relations.
It is the nature of autopoietic organization to impose its own organization as
the structure of reality.
In the monkey,
practically all determination and inhibition of behaviour is due to external,
immediately present social forces (presence of other animals) rather than
concrete environmental features (Count 1973:97). The abstraction from concrete
environmental or social "warning mechanisms" is carried furthest in
the human species (perhaps the cetaceans are an exception), where the
importance of internalising social forces is tremendously expanded. The
autopoietic position holding that the nervous system is a closed system
imposing its own structure upon reality can be reconciled with the perspective
that behaviour is determined by external factors. The concept of
"rhythm-taking" (Count 1973, see also Laughlin, d'Aquili, McManus, et
al, 1979) as the fundamental "social glue" among vertebrates is
consistent with the understanding that autopoietic systems can be perturbed by
independent (external) events and consequently undergo compensatory internal
changes. Repeated perturbations can be compensated by repeated series of
internal, though not necessarily identical changes (Valera, 1979:15).
Rhythm-taking may represent a juncture between different orders of autopoietic
systems.
It is widely accepted
that the greatest evolutionary advantage achieved by the human species is an
unsurpassed adaptability. As a species or as individuals we cannot only live,
live well, etc. in almost every geographic location on the globe, but can
acclimatize with relative ease from one location to another (perhaps even off
the globe as well). The capacity for this agility in making an indeterminate
number of ecosystems comfortably our own depends (among other things) on the
isomorphic developments of our sexual and symbolizing processes.
At the human level the
interests of both of the biogrammatic phases are brought into mutual relation
and support (Count 1973:108). Humans differ from other vertebrates and
alloprimates in the particularly rich contents that are contained within their
biogrammatic framework. These contents are indicative of the influence of
symbolopoetic action upon (without disrupting) the more fundamental neuro-psychic
mechanisms (Count 1973:106). While continuing to share an innate grounding with
lower relatives, the power to symbolize permits social generalizations, eg.
eidolons (Count 1973:107). Symbolopoesis is not simply attributable to cerebral
mechanisms or to neocortical function; rather, "it is profoundly a
functioning of a mechanismal totality" (Count 1973:263). It will be argued
that the richer content that the human has fitted into the biogrammatic
framework is implicit in the human sexual dimorphism.
Included in the process
of homination is the emergence of multivalent symbols and multiple statuses
(Count 1973:100). Statuses can be understood as particular cases of
contingencies-of-relationship involving reciprocation and permitting the
development of more complex meta-categories (group statuses, statuses of
statuses, etc.). An increase in the flexibility and complexity of contingencies
of relationship is not simply a consequence of cerebral developments. It is one
of the systemic requirements that go hand in homeomorphogenetic hand with
patterned evolutionary refinements.
Bateson (1972) has
proposed that the fundamental components of mammalian communication are
contingencies of relationship. The development of phasia may represent the
emergence of a capacity to communicate in a way, and about, other than
contingencies of relationship[4]. Count (1973:216) links
phasia and communication in this way:
…it is
a real gain, furthermore, when phasia is recognized as being but a
particularized case within the more general and comprehensive phenomenon of
communication between animals, and when we recognize that we cannot hope for
understanding of the particular unless we base it upon the more comprehensive.
It may be important at this point to expand upon the concepts of status, and contingencies of relationship. Statuses are defined as social generalizations. In man statuses themselves, can achieve status and thus, humans are the only species known which has the capacity to hold plural statuses simultaneously (Count 1973:148). Furthermore, status is a moiety of a dyad, a notion which comes very close to that of contingencies of relationship. Bateson (1972:3667) outlines how communication among mammals inevitably occurs in terms of patterns and contingencies of relationship. For instance, when one's cat is trying to ask for food it does so by making sounds and movements characteristic of a kitten to its mother. It would be inappropriate to translate the cat's message as a cry for milk or Meow Mix. A more apt translation would be to say that the cat is asserting "dependency! dependency!" It is the context, that is the cat's physical location in the kitchen, near the refrigerator, etc. that allows us to make the deductive leap of how the cat is dependent on us. Another context such as the door would tempt us to interpret the cat's "dependence" as a specific call to be let out[5].
It may be that the great
new feature emerging out of the evolution of human language was not the ability
to abstract or generalize, but the discovery of being able to be specific about
something other than relationship. Despite this achievement human behaviour has
scarcely been affected, as it is rare for any communicational event not to
engender the devotion of a few neurons to the question of what does the
communication indicate about the relationship between the communicators.
The development of
language (dependent on the capacity for phasia and symbolopoesis) may be the
foundation upon which the ability to hold multiple statuses. All statuses are
somehow codes which become formalized out of groups (Count 1973:148). Fluid
patterns of communication utilizing contingencies of relationship can become
fixed in symbol and in identity as part of an "organizational homeostasis
and locative ego." The importance of status is not limited to (though it
is inseparable from) communication potentials. The humanization of the primate
familialism is effected by the Weiterbildung of
"status" which is the cohesive of vertebrate sociality in general
(Count 1973:146). By regarding the evolution of phasia, symbolopoesis,
increasing complexities of social interaction etc. as homeomorphogenic
complexes of systems, the foundation is laid for a clearer view of the novelty
of human dimorphism.
In Count's view (1973:45)
the reproductive system from ape to man has evolved hardly at all[6]. However, human sexuality
in relation to alloprimates reflects a vastly more powerful information
processing capacity while interrelating with a very similar
"visceral" brain and a quasi-identical reproductive mechanism. In
this respect Count is accurate, yet though the differences between the
reproductive systems may be small, their effect is disproportionately profound.
The highly significant developments of phasia and symbolopoesis with the
neurophysiology responsible would seem to presume (through the principle of
homeomorphogenesis) equally significant developments in human sexuality and the
underlying sexual morphology and neurophysiology.
The vertebrate
reproductive syndrome is always a matter of bisexual complementarity. In
menstruating primates the unremitting succession of cycles is matched by a
sexual constancy in the male. Thus, the male pituitary is always secreting
gonadotrophic hormones with the result that the neurologic mechanisms are never
without some degree of tonus due to sex hormones (Count 1973:90). As stated
previously, at the human level both the non-reproductive and reproductive
biogrammatic interests are brought into mutual relation and support. The
interests and capabilities of the non-reproductive phase can be activated
concurrently with the interests and capabilities of the reproductive phase. The
reproductive biogrammatic interests are initiated by social "warning
mechanisms" (the actual presence as well as the internalized
representations of other humans and subsequent categories of contingencies of
relationship) occurring on either single or combined levels (Count, 1973:97).
In humans there is a phenomenological complexity arising as a consequence of
the interfacing of different orders (including the structural particularities or
dynamics of each system) of autopoietic networks. For instance, the single or
combined occurrence between individuals, of types of pupillary reflexes, types
of voice tones, types of situational contexts, and types of contact, age
differences etc. can shift the relational emphasis remarkably.
A fundamental distinction
can be made between primate and human biograms that centers on the uniqueness
of the human menstrual cycle. Count (1973:89) describes the menstrual cycle as:
…a
specialization of the mammalian oestral cycle, which, roughly speaking, is the
symptomatic of the alternating and successive presidencies of estrogens and
progesterone; reflecting a further micro-anatomical evolution. It is
definitively identifiable as such only when we reach the level of the monkeys.
This description is
accurate only to a point, for it misses the emergent relational potential that
becomes manifest in the human. The primate menstrual cycle represents the
development of a reproductive cycle that is largely independent of external
concrete (except perhaps the lunar cycle) and social "warning
mechanisms." While the same is true of the human menstrual cycle, there is
an additional development.
With the merging of the
evolutionary and exploratory flexibilities of the non-reproductive biogrammatic
interests into reproductive biogrammatic modalities, sexual behaviour comes to
function as a context for, as well as within the contexts of, a wide variety of
categories of contingencies of relationship. More simply, sexual behaviour becomes
"neocortical" in the metamorphic sense that it functions as a
"field" or "stratum" within which many other areas of
activity ultimately (and intimately) become associated with one another. Sex is
no longer exclusively for reproduction, but becomes generalized to levels of
social and individual play, communication, pleasure, etc., independent of
environmental and reproductive cycles while at the same time continuing to
function as a medium of social cohesion.
The discussion can now
focus on a few specific examples of the distinctly human dimorphism. According
to Count (1973:145) about the only distinctively human physiological feature of
the reproductive system are the labia majora. Furthermore, the corresponding
human perineum lacks the periodic swelling normally advertising oestrus in the
female alloprimate. The human labia are best understood as predominantly a
feature of the adaptive remodeling of the pelvis perineum as orthogradation is
acquired. Accordingly the sexual pattern of physiological responses is not
materially altered by these labia. However, the frequency of face to face
copulation has shifted from its relatively low incidence among alloprimates to
being almost universal in humans due, among other things, to the
orthogradational remodeling.
The significance of the
"orthogradational remodeling" cannot simply be restricted to raising
the frequency of face to face copulation. What the new morphology permits is of
the same order as "learning how to learn", that is, the significance
is not additive (two sex positions instead of just one) but rather it is
exponential (once there is an awareness of choice, perception can open to the
potential of generating more choices). The implications of ventro-ventral
copulation become much clearer when contextually located within a sexuality not
limited to the reproductive syndrome. Within sexual interactions that are
contextually play, communication, pleasure, etc. the potential for a great deal
more complexity and information exchange in a ventro-ventral interaction is
self-evident. Of course the very possibility of choice inevitably makes any
specific choice a communication issue, with implications of different
contingencies of relationship and even of different statuses.
In a similar line of
thought Alice S. Rossi (1985:15) considers that:
…the
deposition of fat during human adolescence on the breasts and buttocks is a
unique feature of human sexual dimorphism that constitutes a continuous
advertisement of an ability to lactate rather than a cyclic fertility
advertised by oestrous swelling as do so many other higher primates.
A continuous advertisement of the ability to lactate carries a message of a contingency of relationship implying a nurturer/nurtured mutualism. Within this mutualism lies a potential for nuances of status reverberances (Count, 1973:104,131,151)[7]. Rossi's observations should also be considered in the context of a sexual morphology that is not solely limited to a reproductive syndrome. Thus, the increased erogenous sensitivity of the human breasts may be considered as homeomorphogenically related to a highly complex morphology optimising the likelihood of face to face interaction as well as enabling the potential merging of previously phase specific foci of interests such as feeding and copulation (Morgan, 1985:2830).
Taking the uniqueness of
human sexuality further, Paula Weideger (1975:130) comments that:
…certainly
in the human being, sex is altogether independent of reproduction in many
respects. Not only as a continuous possibility of sexual intercourse, but a
continuous sexuality which precedes the introduction of menstrual cycles and
which continues long after menstruation has finally ceased. For the human
female alone among mammalian species, sexuality is present from birth to death,
(noting of course the clitoral response enjoyed from early in development).
Later Weideger (1975:139)
includes a qualification with respect to the human species' distance from the
strict hormonal control of sexual behaviour with a reminder that as a species,
humans have demonstrated a great facility for conjuring up constraints
(emotional and otherwise) that are fully as limiting and confining as any
strictly physiological constraints might be. The cultural and individual
variety of socially constructed constraints is indicative of both a latent behavioral
flexibility, and of a relational or social matrix upon which an organizational
homeostasis can be attached with the consequence of a greater independence from
specific "concrete" environments. The potential for this sort of
behavioral flexibility is not purely dependent on a neuro-anatomy but is
implicit in human sexual dimorphism.
Thus, the pattern which
connects the complex probabilistic system that is the brain as a
homeomorphogenically evolved subsystem of an organism-environment mutualism, is
in the nature of an implicit interlocking of sets of potentials or
predispositions inherent in the morphology of both brain and sex systems. The
evolution of the neocortex as an ultimate choice-maker and symbol-processor, is
inseparable from and isomorphic with the evolution of a sexual dimorphism which
permits a greater spectrum of intra and inter associative, and relational
complexities of the organism-environment mutualism.
The human biogram may be
viewed as a recent evolutionary strategy aimed at answering the necessities of
living, living well, and living better. Inherent in the embodiment of this
"answer" is:
- A relative autonomy from specific environmental contingencies;
- Complex patterns of hierarchical and non-hierarchical social relations and contingencies of relationship; and
- A social cohesive utilizing either or both the non-reproductive and reproductive behavioral repertoires, in sequence or simultaneously.
The present chapter has
outlined some of the unique systems within the human biogram. The emphasis has
been to focus on a species level understanding of human sexual dimorphism. In
the following chapter we will shift our focus to an elaboration of sex specific
structural and ontologic processes underlying human sex dimorphism. We will
also emphasize the consequent phenomenological, perceptual, and cognitive
associations as they are likely to be experienced by individuals of each sex.
Chapter Three – Defining Processes: Grounding a
Symbolic Template
This chapter presents the
kernel of the thesis. Sex-specific developmental patterns that are active on a
continuous as well as a phasic basis will be elaborated and integrated with the
theory of autopoiesis.
The notion that the
processes underlying human biological dimorphism are the foundation of a
symbolic template out of which gender categories and knowledge develop,
requires a particular theoretical focus. The autopoietic concepts elaborated in
chapter one permit both the processual and the organizational nature of
biological development to be articulated. Putting it more simply it can be said
that possessing a female or male body is not like possessing a static
fact/noun/category, but is rather like being within a developmental,
experiential, unfolding process. Sex-specific morphological development,
inevitably involves apparently teleological, guiding patterns of organizing
information. In addition, the biological entity, from conception to death,
experiences its ontology (guided by inherent patterns of organizing
information), as a perceiving being.
Perceptions are both
shaped by the highest level of organization and registered as tacit,
unconscious experiences that further reinforce the inherently existing pattern
of organization. The development of the nervous system (sensorium) is precisely
and innately ordered. While never fixed or inflexible, "sensorial
organization emerges during development mediating an ever ordered, yet ever
richer, more flexible, and more complex field of perception" (Laughlin
1983). In autopoietic terms this is the subordination of an organism's
phenomenology to its structural ontology. In the same way sex is not a
"thingness" given at some developmental stage and remaining an
unchanged characteristic throughout life. Rather, sex is a verb, a process of a
patterned organization of fundamental experiences. The shifting of sex as noun,
to sex as a dynamic experiential process is fundamental to a more useful
analysis of the foundations of gender.
The cosmologies and
belief systems of many cultures make non-arbitrary symbolic use of gender to
label or make fundamentally distinct, components of experience or
consciousness. By non-arbitrary we mean that the assignment of gender terms
appears to be lawful and regularly patterned cross-culturally (Laughlin 1983).
The basis of such patterned gender attribution may be rooted in a context of
biogenetically structured perceptual experiences. The perceptual experiences
are particular to each sex, with initial primary perceptions becoming layered
upon with the subsequent unfolding of typical developmental processes. The
primacy of perception over cognitive differentiation not only dominates early
neurocognitive development but continues to form the 'ground of being' out of
which cognition arises. The inherent order of perception is primary not only
for moment-to-moment cognition but for ontogenesis as well (Laughlin 1983). The
perceptual 'ground' becomes relatively unconscious as higher cognitive
functions emerge and as such remains as a matrix of perceptual filters shaping the
formation of a symbolic template.
In terms of autopoiesis
what we are referring to is an equation of sex specific morphology and ontology
with the structural (as opposed to organizational) aspect of an autopoietic
system. Subsequently therefore, perceptual filters refer to the ontologically
dependent phenomenology by which an autopoietic system specifies a reality
(cognitive or otherwise).
To understand this sex
specific phenomenology requires that at least two interrelated levels or orders
of human sexual dimorphism have to be examined. The first level or order
primarily pertains to species being, while the second level or order primarily
pertains to individual being. Since the implications of the first level are
pervasive throughout the second level, initial elaboration will begin with this
level. It must be stressed that these levels are not mutually exclusive but are
complexly interrelated. Furthermore, a complete elaboration of all the
pertinent structural processes is impossible. What will be undertaken is a
presentation of several interrelated lines of evidence by which we hope to
establish the reasonableness of the thesis.
Instrumental to the
formation of sex-specific perceptual filters and a symbolic template is the
inevitable association of the womb with the lifeworld
(Laughlin, 1983:2). Memories of the largely undifferentiated totality of
immediate perceptual experience within the womb/lifeworld become associated with or symbolized by mother. Mother
also becomes the first and quintessential 'woman'. Thus, despite the emergence
of more advanced neurocognitive functions, a fundamental cognitive formula
remains as an organizing or perceptual filter: "womb=woman=world" (Laughlin
1983). Although autopoiesis stresses the autonomy and self-referential
circularity of living systems the cognitive equation cited above is not
inconsistent with autopoiesis. The cognition of "womb=woman=world"
can be likened to a first order (individual) autopoietic organism's perception
of its autopoietic subservience to the higher order (species) autopoietic
system.
The influence of the
perceptual relationship of the pre- and perinatal child to the lifeworld is pertinent on at least two
levels. Fundamental to sex-specific developmental processes and the
corresponding organizing of perceptions are the different relationships of each
sex to the maternal environment/lifeworld,
or womb. On a cultural level, the predominating orientation toward the lifeworld will influence how the sex
specific perceptual filters will specify and integrate particular cognitions of
gender. For example, a positive orientation to the lifeworld tends to encourage individuals to substantiate,
integrate, and potentially to transcend ontologically sex specific perceptual
orientations into complementary cognitions of the other sex. By complementary
we intend a sense of symmetry, balance and fluidity of interaction.
On the other hand, an
ambivalent or negative orientation to the lifeworld
fosters a substantiation, integration and crystallization of each sex into
a cognition defined in terms of some sort of opposition to the other sex. By
oppositional we mean a sense of a more radical asymmetry, conflict, segregation
and anxiety emphasizing a need to control or dominate the other sex. Since the
nervous systems of all people appear to develop in a very determinate manner
during pre- and perinatal life, and the womb for all people provides a fairly
similar environment we may feel secure in assuming that this sort of cognition
process is universal (Laughlin 1983:245).
To reiterate, the
developmental processes integral to each sex can be viewed as a tri-level
experience: the unfolding process of the sensorium, the perceptual experience mediated
by the sensorium, and the cognitive/cultural appreciation of the developmental
process. While the underlying cognitive and perceptual processes are universal,
the virtually unlimited potential for variety in behaviour arises with the
highly complex interrelations between these levels of experience and the many
other environmental and cultural variables that are possible.
An epistemology of gender
presupposes the view that:
…consciousness
is present in the prenatal child at or near conception and that it develops as
function of the development of its operating neurocognitive structures,
particularly those mediating the sensorium (Laughlin 1983:11).
Equating consciousness with symbolopoesis and the progressive development of the nervous system, assumes the subordination of an organism's phenomenology to its structure and ontology. To put it another way, each of these levels is guided by isomorphic patterns of organizing information. To understand the perceptually based knowing of gender that this work posits an appropriate description of the processual differences inherent to each sex is required.
It has been postulated
that the X and Y chromosomes may be in charge of an auxiliary system which
intervenes after conception in the way that the other 44 chromosomes are
expressed (Durden-Smith and deSimone, 1983:113). It is believed that the X
chromosome is largely sexually neutral. Its role in sex differentiation is
primarily involved with the maintenance of the ovarian function in the female.
Although the information it carries is essential for proper development beyond
that specific to sex morphology, as no person, stillbirth, or abortus has been
found without at least one X chromosome (Ounsted and Taylor, 1972:245,249).
Even in the event where only one X chromosome is present, female morphological
development proceeds to some degree with the exception that ovaries and the
subsequent hormonal cycles do not develop.
Only the Y chromosome is
sex determining yet does not contain any complex male forming genes. In fact it
contains no significant genetic information specific to itself (only a gene for
hairy ears) (Bleier, 1984:41). Its primary function is believed to be the
"cause of certain potential autosomal and X coded, information to become
manifest in the phenotype" (Ounsted and Taylor, 1972:245: see also
Durden-Smith and deSimone, 1983:114). Furthermore, in males, the transcription
of expressed genomic information takes place at a slower ontogenic pace
(Ounsted and Taylor, 1972:245). The sexes differ in the regulation of their
developmental pace, which when seen as a continuous and timely sequence of
interactions between the expression of genetic information and environmental
contingencies, implies important and widespread consequences for individuals of
each sex (Ounsted and Taylor, 1972:246).
The first step in a long
ontological sequence begins with the differentiation of the gonads early in
fetal development. The differentiation of sex morphology occurs within the womb
during the fifth to twelfth week of ontogenesis. For the first five weeks of
embryonic life all embryos are morphologically female. If the fetal gonads are
removed before differentiation takes place, the embryo will autonomously
continue to develop into an apparent female morphology, lacking only ovaries,
regardless of the genetic sex (Sherfey 1972:38). Sexual differentiation occurs
during the following three to seven weeks. However, it is only the male who is
required to undergo a sex-specific transformation of morphology (Sherfey
1972:40). In order to do this the male embryo must elaborate extremely large
quantities of androgen (relatively speaking) throughout fetal life to overcome
both its innate female anatomy and the effects of the circulating maternal
estrogens (Sherfey 1972:43). Certain complications can arise if the particular
male embryo happens for some reason to be androgen insensitive, or fails to
produce androgen. In such cases the embryo will remain an apparently
morphologically female, until puberty when expected further female development
fails to occur.
At this point it is
perhaps useful to characterize, on a sort of archetypal level, the male's
perceptual experience of his relationship to the lifeworld that results from his structural developmental pattern.
The male, to be and become a male,[8] must differentiate from
some fundamental aspects of the World Matrix (as womb/lifeworld and represented by the maternal hormonal environment as
well as by the initial female morphology). It is difficult to be more precise,
for what is aimed at is a generalizable characterization of sex-specific
structural transformations and the subsequent cognitions/phenomenologies
associated with such transformative processes.
During the period of sex
differentiation and in fact throughout the entire term the genetically female
embryo's relationship (in terms of relatively sex-specific hormonal
communication) to the lifeworld/environment
can be characterized as one of similarity-to or identity-with. It is difficult
to determine the significance of the role of either the fetal or maternal
estrogen in the full development of the female pattern (Sherfey 1972:40). Of
course it is acknowledged that the similarities of experience within the womb
for all neonates regardless of sex, far outnumber the differences.
Additionally, individual differences in experiences within the womb also
outnumber those occurring between the sexes. However, the actual 'weight' of
the differences may be substantially disproportionate to their number. The task
of this work is the elegant characterization of the developmental differences
particular to each sex. Thus, consistent with what could be likened as a type
of higher level or archetypal pattern of organizational instruction guiding
structural transformations, which in turn pattern perception and experience,
the genetic male apparently has to differentiate
from the environment (as womb=woman=world). Only in this way
will the male be able to develop the expected male morphology and embark on the
lifelong experiences corresponding with such a body. In autopoietic terms, this
developmental pattern is more than a single structural transformation, rather
it is a feature of the male's (as a living autopoietic system) ontologic
organization, and thus of his organismic identity. We reiterate that maleness
is not to be equated with masculinity.
The female on the other
hand can be characterized, in her pattern of morphological development, as identifying-with-the-environment[9]. The characterization is
derived from the previously mentioned difficulty in determining the influential
primacy of the fetal or maternal estrogens in the female neonate's development
as well as the relatively homogeneous continuation of her ontology in respect
to the initial morphology. Thus, the female's structural ontology may also
reflect a particular organization/identity. This initial and embryonic genesis
of sex morphology is the foundational perceptual template upon which later
metamorphically similar perceptions will be overlaid/associated.
The next phase in the
developmental sequence of patterned differences of perceptual experiences
involves the interaction of infant and mother at birth. What is important to
consider is not only the event of birth, but the entire period of early child
development. Nancy Chodorow (1978) has elaborated the different perceptual
experiences, from a psychoanalytic viewpoint, of pre-oedipal, and oedipal
children. Chodorow feels that many, if not all, gender differences are due to
the socialization occurring through the psychological experiences at this time.
In particular, she believes that the differences in gender are the consequence
of female-exclusive mothering. Her solution posits that early and equal
involvement by males in the parenting of children would alleviate much of the
gender-specific psychodynamics. Much as this may change many of the
psychodynamics, it leaves the previously mentioned differences in ontological
process and subsequent perceptual/cognitive experiences which are inherent in
male and female morphology unaccounted for.
At birth a similarly
patterned relationship to the mother/lifeworld
is likely to occur, although it will be qualified by the particular culture's
orientation to the lifeworld. The
female child is born from a female and is female. A recognition which can
typically arise on some level between the mother and daughter is (all things
being equal) likely to embrace aspects of identity that build on the initial
primary perceptual experience and organizational identity. The male child,
however, is born from a female but is not female. A recognition between mother
and son can typically involve some aspects of identity but would logically
include a profoundly different emphasis on those aspects relating to the
other-than-self[10]. Despite the fact that in
some societies all children are categorized as 'its' along with the elderly,
who also return to this category, the potential for the recognition of the
individual child's future sex (if not gender) undoubtedly remains.
The different
relationships to the lifeworld that
are established in utero, during birth, and in early infancy continue to
manifest throughout the life of the individual. Apart from the infant's bonding
with mother as primary love object (Chodorow, 1978), the relationship between
male and female parental figures is the first social dyad that is encountered
by the infant. These parental figures not only represent the primary gender
role models, but also provide the basis of family role interactions from which
a child derives an initial orientation toward society (Laughlin, 1983:3).
Simultaneous with the
growing awareness of the – parental male/female dyad is the gradual emergence
of more advanced neurocognitive functions mediated by structures which include
the prefrontal lobes, the inferior parietal lobe and secondary association
areas. The cognitions which are mediated by these structures (and throughout
their ontological unfolding) develop within an orientational context that is
either in complementarity with, or in opposition to, the primacy of the world
of immediate experience perceptually the womb=woman=world (Laughlin, 1983:4).
Despite the orientational
context, cognitive development represents the differentiation of distinct
concepts, objects and events from an undifferentiated unfolding-enfolding lifeworld. Furthermore, these cognitions
emerge and develop in a sort of isomorphic conjunction with a growing awareness
of the parental dyad and thus, become associated with the male parental figure
and subsequently with the male in general (Laughlin, 1983:34).
Theoretical explanations
of the equation of male with knowledge acquired during, and derived from,
conceptual development would include the:
…recognition
of simple intransivity (lifeworld = mother, mother ≠ father, father = cogito) in a Piagetian (1980:84) frame, or the simple logic of
metaphoric and metonymic relations (lifeworld:mother
:: cogito:father) in a Levi Straussian (1968) frame (Laughlin, 1983:4).
While the above equation
utilizes the linking of mother with father, it may be important to note that
the "institutions" of motherhood and fatherhood are quite different
in that motherhood is incontrovertibly "organic" whereas fatherhood
requires a more culturally dependent knowledge of paternity. This sort of
knowledge is isomorphic with the neurocognitive process whereby the
differentiation of discrete objects/events serves in the adaptation to an
"ever unfolding-enfolding lifeworld"
(Laughlin, 1983:4). Thus, despite the incredible cultural variation in the
details of gender categories and roles, an initial non-arbitrary association of
the female (and feminine gender categories) with the lifeworld, is matched by an equally non-arbitrary association of
the male (and masculine gender categories) with the process by which cognition
develops its adaptive structures (Laughlin, 1983:4). By extension it is equally
possible that there is a non-arbitrary association of the male with a
differentiation from the lifeworld.
The next significant
phase in the unfolding ontology of sexual dimorphism which offers events and
perceptual experiences with deep implications for each sex occurs at puberty.
During this period of dynamic transition the morphologies and nervous systems
of both sexes substantially mature, thus becoming (potentially at least) more
actively engaged in higher order autopoietic (species level) phenomenology. The
onset of this phase of development carries the potential for an increase in the
cognitive appraisal of present and prior perceptual experiences. Experiences
during this time are cognitive and perceptual, conscious and unconscious,
unique to the period and patterned upon previous experiences. While many of the
changes that both sexes undergo are similar in nature, some profound
differences exist between the sexes, including the onset of menstruation in the
female and possibly the mature phallus[11] in the male. The significance of the menstrual cycle
should be elaborated in order to grasp more completely the pervasive influence
of the cycle in shaping perceptual experience, and substantiating the
bio-symbolic template.
In much of the literature
concerning the physiological features significant to the evolution of our
species, the elaboration of the leap from the oestrus to the menstrual cycle
has received little emphasis. The radical difference between oestrus and
menstruation is often misunderstood. In the oestrus cycle sexual receptivity
occurs only in conjunction with ovulation, and "bleeding" is both a
visual and olfactory signal of approaching and actual receptivity. In the
menstrual cycle, however, "the libido is liberated," as sexual
receptivity is no longer dependent on ovulation in the female. Sexual
receptivity becomes a question of a host of many other factors, which most
likely increase as the psychological complexity of both the individual and the
culture/environment increases.
It is possible to view,
for analytical purposes, the menstrual cycle as divided into four phases:
pre-ovulatory; ovulatory; premenstrual; and menstrual. Consequently the
complete rhythm of the cycle may be experienced as a fourfold one. However,
these and other more complicated rhythms emerge from a basic and powerful
twofold beat inherent in the two poles or culminations of the menstrual cycle:
ovulation, the shedding of the ripe egg into the fallopian tube; and
menstruation, the shedding of the thick, built-up lining of the womb resulting
in the wall becoming thin and exquisitely sensitive and sometimes likened to a
wound (Shuttle and Redgrove, 1978:29).
Further characterizations
can be made of the two poles to the menstrual cycle. Ovulation can be
characterized as being concerned with the continuation of the species,
embodying values pertinent to the survival of the species. Menstruation on the
other hand can be characterized as being concerned with the individual female
embodying values pertinent to individual survival (Shuttle and Redgrove 1978).
Physiologically the two cycles, ovarian and uterine, are linked by very complex
systems of nerve/hormone pathways interacting in networks of influence. The
cycles are mutually sensitive, feeding back one with the other. Complicating
matters, however, ovulation (with or without a temperature rise) may occur at
any point in or even twice in the same cycle. Despite the possible regularity
of ovulation at mid-cycle it remains sensitive to unknown rules. These unknown
rules most likely involve phenomenological emergents[12] resulting from the unique
human structural dimorphism in which both the biogrammatic (reproductive and
non-reproductive) interests and capacities are brought into mutual relation and
support. Thus, what is usually considered a single cycle under the label of the
menstrual cycle can perhaps be more accurately analyzed as a bi-phasic cycle,
representing an alteration of values oriented to the species at one end and the
individual at the other.
Another common
misapprehension concerning the menstrual cycle is its characterization as a
larger period of normality punctuated by a shorter period of bleeding
accompanied by unpleasant emotional and physical symptoms which in turn are
assumed to be the basis of the development of menstrual taboos. However, the
menstrual cycle is actually a continuous process of daily physiological and
more often than not, unconscious psychological/attitudinal changes. Evidence of
the largely unconscious attitudinal changes can be found in studies noting
changes in the tone of sexuality and types of dreams experienced during the
ovulatory or menstrual peaks (Shuttle and Redgrove 1978).
It is important to hold
in mind the point made in the second chapter, that the menstrual cycle in
liberating the libido makes possible a new level or order of the types of
relationships and contingencies of relationship (emotional, economic, etc.).
The possibility of new types of relationships is profound in its implication
for the development of new types of social organization, and thus is a fundamental
element in the foundation of any society. Further significance of the menstrual
cycle can now be elaborated, so as to disclose the relation of this aspect of
sex differentiation in the same vein as the account of pre- and perinatal
development.
It is not an uncommon
phenomenon, that when a group (two or more) of women are in some form of close
association their cycles can synchronize. The synchronization of the menstrual
cycle that is possible between women can also extend to include the lunation cycle
(Shuttle and Redgrove 1978:133-5,156-60). This sort of inter-subjective cycle
synchronization can be a potentially profound source of "knowledge"
of the world, potentially leading to the formation of information sharing and
processing cults (religious or otherwise) (Shuttle and Redgrove, 1978:25). The
cognitive and perceptual association of the female with the lunar rhythms and
the moon, and the moon with the biosphere/lifeworld
can act as a powerful reaffirmation of the original perceptual experiences of
the prenatal relationship with the womb/world. Even though cycles do not always
remain synchronized, or may not synchronize at all, it is tempting to make the
association between the isomorphic nature of the lunar cycle and the average
female cycle.
Riding on the end of a
beam of light, we can examine the influence of the lunar cycle in the
development of notions of time and thus also of certain types of knowing and
memory. The lunar cycle provides not only a marker of the passing months, but
with the new, first quarter (appearing as a half-circle), full, and third
quarter (appearing as the other half-circle) moon, is a marker of the week. The
lunar cycle also individuates each day within the context of a month as
distinct from the other days. For the female, the lunar cycle thus provides a
potentially external marker of her own internally experienced cyclic process.
The resonance of experiences if the menstrual and lunar cycle are synchronized
optimises the potential for the integration into the cognized environment of
the notions of time, the body/psyche's internal processual cycling, and thus of
certain types of knowing-predicting, or the beginning of a certain type of
gnosis. The menstrual cycle's correlated phases of attitudes/orientation and
dreams/symbols (Shuttle and Redgrove 1978) can also find their interpretive
Rorschach in the daily transformation of lunar appearances. Thus, the
physiological and psychological aspects of the menstrual cycle can find
powerfully isomorphic parallels in the physical (e.g. tides and phasic
appearances) and the symbolic (interpretive associations) aspects of the lunar
cycle. The complex and multileveled possibilities of association between the
menstrual and lunar cycle permits a greater security in the characterization of
female development occurring in a metacontext of an identity-with-environment.
A parallel of the onset
of menstruation in the female is the maturation of the male's experience of
erection, and the capacity for ejaculation of a new fluid – semen. However, no
matter how distinctly male this new capability is, it remains associated with
the autoerotic, oceanic feeling, or uroboric experience of primal unity and
thus with some aspect or guise of the maternal/feminine/natural (Neumann, 1954,
see also Monick, 1987; Jung, CW 10; Vanggaard, 1972; and Dulaure, 1934). A
brief elaboration of the phenomenological/cognitive dynamics involved with the
male's "phallocentric" structural – ontological, transformations will
help to delineate further the processual and organizational pattern that is
relative to the male.
The symbolic aspect of
the erect penis has commonly been termed "Phallus." As a symbol, its
meanings generally extend beyond the directly biological[13] and the roles serving
goals other than passion[14] or procreation (Vanggaard,
1972:11). In its symbolic aspect, the phallus is multivocalic"[15] and can incorporate
implications of power, pleasure, fertility and more. All of these aspects
overlap inextricably and as is generic to an understanding of any symbol, the
comprehension of one aspect involves a simultaneous grasping of the symbol and
its referents as a whole field.
The phallus as a symbol
of power can be related to fundamental biogram patterns that have become
utilized as tools communicating certain categories of contingencies of
relationship. A prototypical demonstration of the aggressive erection is the
baboon sitting on guard with an erect penis. Vanggaard (1972:109) suggests that
since erections and seminal emission have been observed not infrequently in
association with aggressive or fearful dream situations, aggressiveness may be
an effective stimulus for erection or peno-anal activity. He goes further by
comparing this sort of asexual erection occurring during dreams with the
erections depicted in the bronze age petroglyphs:
...in
the pictures of these rock carvings erection appears, as in dreams, in
association with sexual and aggressive scenes and in addition with other
activities such as sailing, plowing, and hunting which can be regarded as expressions
of male powerfulness and capability in the widest sense, but which are neither
directly sexual nor aggressive (Vanggaard, 1972:109).
Vanggaard's use of the
terms "male powerfulness and capability" is perhaps misleading in
that they tend to presuppose sex differences in capability and thus are likely
to lead to the type of controversy founded on the confusion of sex differences
with behavioral prescriptions. A more useful description of the association of
the erection and the activities cited by Vanggaard may be in the isomorphic
nature of the relational contingencies between the participant and the context.
Thus rather than expressing inherent power or capability the erection as
phallus is a symbol in a relational context. For example, the erection may be a
response to a perceptual Gestalt of having to enter into (e.g. by
"penetrating," "merging-with" or "being engulfed
by") a relational context in which there is an implicit liminal experience
to the differentiation of self from lifeworld.
While considerably more
can be said that is of importance about the phallus, only one more feature is
essential to consider in this discussion. The apparent autonomy of the phallus
lends itself to a cognition of a type of transpersonal experience. According to
Monick (1987:17):
…the
physical phallus has become a religious and psychological symbol because it
decides on its own, independent of its owner's ego decision, when and with whom
it wants to spring into action. It is thus an appropriate metaphor for the unconscious
itself, and specifically the male mode of the unconscious.
In Images and Symbols Mircea Eliade discusses this apparent "autonomous mode of cognition" as the basis of a transcendent means to knowledge. In fact he says that "sexuality has everywhere and always been a hierophany" (Eliade, 1969:14).
According to Neumann
(1954:309):
…mythologically,
the phallic-chthonic deities are companions of the Great Mother, not
representatives of the specifically masculine. Psychologically this means that
phallic masculinity is still conditioned by the body[16] and thus is under the
rule of the Great Mother, whose instrument it remains.
There is much
cross-cultural evidence indicating the perception of the autonomous nature of
the phallus. For instance, Neumann (1954:49, see also Dulaure, 1934), states
that all phallic cults, invariably solemnized by women, have the similar theme:
the anonymous power of the fertilizing agent as the human individual is merely
the bearer of "that which does not pass away and cannot be interchanged
because it is the self-same phallus." The phallus as a symbol of fertility
is like paternity, a cultural development. The male begins by "being a copulater, not a begetter."
Even when the phallus is worshiped as an instrument of fertility it has
generally been in the nature of the opener
of the womb rather than the giver of seed and a bringer of joy rather than
of fruitfulness (Neumann, 1954:309).
It is perhaps possible to
understand the experience and symbolic cognition of the phallus as autonomous,
in autopoietic terms. By considering the different levels or orders of
autopoietic systems, then both the phallus and certain aspects of the menstrual
cycle can be viewed as phenomenological consequences of the structural bridges
between these different orders of autopoietic system (i.e. the bridge between
the individual as an autopoietic system and the species as an autopoietic
system). The subordination of lower order autopoietic systems to the
maintenance of higher order autopoietic systems provides a firm base upon which
the cognitive and perceptual phenomenology of sexuality as autonomous,
transpersonal or hierophanic. While both males and female can experience their
own sexualities as autopoietically hierophanic the difference between them is in
the identification with the lifeworld
(as higher order autopoietic matrix) which that sexuality serves.
Perhaps the most powerful
indicator of the structural differences between the sexes can be found in the
different experience/perceptions of each sex's involvement in procreation. The
female in carrying the developing embryo has access to a cognitive and/or
perceptual experience of "other" as within. Even more so, there are
profound structural processes (autopoietic patterns of organizing information)
which are required to make procreation possible. In accepting sperm and
maintaining pregnancy the female has to modulate her own immune system. The
immune system can be characterized as those aspects of an autopoietic system
responsible for the maintenance of self/identity by discriminating against that
which is not self. The female must be able to suppress one arm of her immune
system so that it will tolerate the sperm and then the fetus inside her, while
simultaneously boosting another arm in order to have the extra protection
against infection she requires (Durden-Smith and deSimone, 1983:1745).
The autopoietic
organization by which both the structural modulation of the female's immune
system is guided and her ontological processes extend to include the maintenance
of fetus and neonate can be elegantly characterized as multileveled
identification with "other." These structural processes can generate
a perceptual/cognitive phenomenology that is both isomorphic with and overlaid
onto the previously characterized perceptions and cognitions. In this regard,
it is clear that the male's structural ontology is radically different from the
female's and thus likely to generate phenomenological cognitions relatively
differentiated from the female's.
The final line of evidence
which will be presented in support of this thesis concerns sex differences in
brain structure. A good deal of research has been conducted on potential sex
differences in brain structure producing few substantial results. For instance,
sex differences in the nuclear size of nerve cells in the hypothalamus as well
as sex hormone dependent differences in the way the nerve cells were wired,
have been found (Durden-Smith and deSimone, 1983:117; Hutt, 1972:42). However,
the research of central interest to this work has focused on sex differences in
the lateralization of the brain. Briefly, there is evidence that the
hemispheres of male brains are more specialized, communicating to each other in
different languages – verbal and visual-spatial, and only formally after an
encoding into abstract representations (Durden-Smith and deSimone, 1983:73;
Ounsted and Taylor, 1972:138; Rossi, 1985:1824). On the other hand, the
hemispheres of female brains appear not to be so specialized and thus able to
communicate in a much less formal and structured way as well as more rapidly.
The caudal or posterior
end of the corpus callosum (a bundle of fibers by which the two halves of the
brain communicate with each other) has been found to be much wider and larger
in women than in men. In fact:
…so big and clear was the difference that 'impartial observers'
could immediately assign to the right sex – 'with 100% accuracy' – drawings
made from photographs of cross sections (Durden-Smith and deSimone, 1983:76;
see also Rossi, 1985:184).
These differences were
also found in the brains of fetuses that were between the 26th and
the 41st week of gestation. The difference in the sizes of this
inter-hemispheric communicator suggests a greater ease and frequency of
communication between the two hemispheres of female brains.
The implication of these
sorts of structural (or neuro-gnostic) differences between female and male
brains may be viewed as a framework that is homeomorphogenically related to the
other structural differences which we have reviewed. That is, the male's
greater hemispheric specialization and operational independence as well as the
dedication of relatively fewer nerve fibers to inter-hemispheric communication
can be viewed as both the outcome and mediating structure for the homeomorphogenically
patterned perceptions/cognitions of a differentiation from the contextual
matrix. The female's relatively greater correspondences and interdependence
between hemispheres can be similarly viewed as a homeomorphogenetic outcome and
related mediating structure of perceptions/cognitions of an identification with
a contextual matrix. As was stated earlier an initial contextual matrix could
be the pattern of the original female morphology as well as the perceptual
association with the lifeworld.
This chapter has
presented a theoretical base upon which an epistemology of gender can be
placed. Various aspects of sex-specific structural ontologies have been
outlined. The grounding of a cognitive system and phenomenology in the
structural ontology of an autopoietic system was established in chapter one.
Thus, despite the largely overriding similarities in the ontological
development of all humans, the relative differences in the ontologies of the
sexes has been posited as the base of correspondingly different cognitive
systems. These different cognitive systems were characterized as different
orientations relative to the lifeworld
as a contextual matrix. The male structural orientation was characterized as a differentiation-from
the lifeworld
whereas the female structural orientation was characterized as an identification-with
the lifeworld.
The following chapter will further substantiate these two structurally based
orientations through their application to some contemporary anthropological and
psychological theories.
Chapter Four - Perceptual Orientation and the
Specifying of a Reality
Thus far, a theory of the
different autopoietic structures defining male and female morphology and
ontology has been elaborated as a basis for what has been termed a symbolic
template. By symbolic template is meant a kind of perceptual filter or
archetypal pattern, by which information is organized or the phenomenology
consequent on the different structures is patterned. However, the question of
how such perceptual filters would shape a specific and culturally based
symbolic template, or what a particular cognized environment specified by such
a template would look like remains unanswered.
It is the aim of this
chapter to elaborate a brief response to each of these questions. We will deal
with each question in turn. While the scope of this work does not permit a
complete and detailed elaboration, it is possible to illustrate some basic
examples which I hope will provide the reader with a base to picture a more comprehensive
complexity.
The work of Carol
Gilligan (1982) provides a useful view of what a sex-specific cognized
environment may look like. This work is particularly apt in that while it is
contemporary, it presents the articulations of the "female voice" even
when it has not been culturally heard and thus a retrospective hearing is
possible. In the same vein it is possible that Gilligan's viewpoint may be used
to describe universally these relatively sex-specific orientations. The second
section of this chapter will explore the potential contribution of these two
different orientations in understanding how different cultures develop specific
sex-roles and relations.
∞ ⃝ ∞
Freud (1925:257-258)
considered women as naturally less able than men to achieve a sense of the
inexorable, impersonal and independent nature of justice. Recently, Chodorow
(1978) attributed differences in what each sex considers ethically normal not
to anatomy but to the universal responsibility that women largely hold for
early child care. This responsibility has been postulated as the reason for the
female's personality to essentially define itself more in terms of a relation
and connection to others (Gilligan, 1982:7). As a result of this identification
female identity formation tends to occur in a context of ongoing relationship
since mothers and daughters have a greater tendency to experience themselves as
alike and continuous with each other. Male identity on the other hand is more
critically tied to separation and to entail a greater emphasis on individuation
as ego boundaries are more defensively established (Gilligan, 1982:8). The
foundation upon which Gilligan bases the developmental differences is
consistent with the view, developed in the previous chapter, of a female
perceptual orientation of an
identity-with-environment/context and a male perceptual orientation of a differentiation-from-environment/context.
Gilligan (1982:9-10)
cites evidence from a host of sources including both Janet Lever (1976) and
Piaget (1970) indicating certain differences between boys and girls. For
instance, boys increasingly become fascinated with the elaboration of rules and
fair procedures for adjudicating conflicts. This orientation is felt to account
for such behaviours as: boys tending to play more often in large and
age-heterogeneous groups, and that their games tend to last longer than those
of girls. Girls on the other hand, were found to not be so concerned with the
elaboration and maintenance of such a legal system of rules. Thus, when a
quarrel arose, the girls that were being studied tended to subordinate the
game's continuation to the continuation of relationships between the
participants. I imagine that while both girls and boys maintain systems of
competition and rule making, the appearance, function, and nature of these
corresponding systems would tend to differ in much the same way as has been
outlined above.
In terms of
competitiveness, Gilligan (1982:14-15) makes the point that the anxiety
experienced by women in the "fear of success" is present only when
one's success was at the expense of another's failure. Thus, as this view of
individual achievement extends into adulthood, maturity can become equated with
personal autonomy, and predominant concerns with relationship can appear as a
weakness rather than as a strength. According to Gilligan (1982:17) the
elaboration of the knowledge of intimacy, relationships and care is not only
the centre of women's moral development, but also delineates a critical line of
psychological development for both sexes.
When morality is
conceived as concerned with the activities of care, then moral development
involves the understanding of the primacy of responsibility, relationship and
connection. However, the conception of morality as fairness leads moral
development to emphasize the primacy of the individual and of separation as
well as an understanding of rights and rules. In this view moral problems arise
for women due to conflicting responsibilities rather than because of competing
rights. Resolutions for each type of moral problem requires a corresponding
mode of thinking – contextual and narrative for the first and formal and
abstract for the second (Gilligan, 1982:19). Consequently:
It
becomes clear why a morality of rights and non-interference may appear
frightening to women in its potential justification of indifference and
unconcern. At the same time, it becomes clear why, from a male perspective, a
morality of responsibility appears inconclusive and diffuse, given its
insistent contextual relativism (Gilligan, 1982:22).
The two orientations toward morality not only speak of the differences between the sexes but also provide alternative conceptions of maturity. A brief example may serve to illustrate more clearly these two orientations toward moral problems. Gilligan records the responses of a typical boy and girl when posed with a classic moral dilemma. The dilemma concerns a man whose wife will die unless she receives a certain drug. However, the husband has no money to buy the drug. What should he do?
Typically the boy sees
the conflict as one between life and property that can be resolved with a logic
of justification. By choosing theft of the drug the boy avoids confrontation
and abstracts the moral problem from an interpersonal situation. Using a logic
of fairness in order to cast it as an impersonal conflict of claims the boy
transposes a hierarchy of power into a hierarchy of values (Gilligan, 1982:32).
The girl on the other hand appears initially to hesitate, somewhat bewildered.
While theft does not seem a proper solution, what is incomprehensible to her is
that the druggist and the husband do not come to terms. Her solution lies in
activating the network of relationships by communication and including the wife
by strengthening rather than severing the connection. This shift changes the
moral problem from unfair domination and imposition of property over life into
the unnecessary exclusion of the wife by the druggist's failure to respond to
her (Gilligan, 1982:32). Thus the boy demonstrates a sophisticated
understanding of the logic of justification whereas the girl reveals an
understanding of the nature of choice that is equally sophisticated (Gilligan,
1982:32).
The contrasted images of
hierarchy and network within the two different views about morality illustrate
complementary perspectives. The girl assumes connection and can begin to
explore parameters of separation, while the boy assuming separation can move to
explore connection. Subsequent developmental paths would differ correspondingly
for the male and female. The male's development would entail the realization
that other is equal to the self and through that realization comes the
provision that connection is safe. For the female, development proceeds from
the inclusion of herself within an expanding connective network and the
understanding that separation can be protective rather than only isolating
(Gilligan, 1982:39). By understanding these two different developmental paths
delineated as they are by differences in the way the perceptual experiences of
separation and connection are aligned with the "voice of the self" it
is clear that the representation of the male's development as the only model of
development creates a ubiquitous problem in interpreting female development
(Gilligan, 1982:39).
Other evidence cited by
Gilligan included the findings that in thematic apperception tests men tended
to project more violence into situations of personal affiliation than they
projected into impersonal situations of achievement. Women, in contrast
perceived more violence in the impersonal situations of achievement than they
saw in the situation of affiliation (Gilligan, 1982:41).
In the same vein, Robert
May (1980:59-71) identified corresponding patterns in the fantasies of men and
women. The male pattern, termed by May as "Pride" leads from
enhancement to deprivation, from an initial experience of separation (the
severance of connection) to an irreparable loss, from a glorious achievement to
a disastrous fall. Here the theme is one of life as a succession of
relationships, of replacements and separations with attachment or connection as
the final reward of this dangerous and elusive quest.
The female pattern which
May names as "Caring" tends to be a narrative in which connection although
leading through separation is ultimately maintained or restored. Within a
thematic context of life as a web, and a process of continuity and change in
configuration, women portray autonomy as the illusory and dangerous quest
(Gilligan, 1981:48).
In the analysis of men's
and women's self-descriptions Gilligan found the same orientation of identity
around the themes of separation and attachment. Even highly successful and
achieving women depicted their identity ("future mother,"
"present wife," "adopted child," etc.) and measured their
strengths ("giving to," "helping out," "not
hurting," etc.) in relational terms (Gilligan, 1982:159). In the
self-description of men, involvement with others is related as a qualification
rather than a realization of identity. The verbs of attachment that were used
by the women are replaced by the men with adjectives that are descriptive of a
singularity distinct from others. Thus the men describe themselves as
"intelligent," "logical," "honest" and even of
having or wishing to have "real contacts" or "deep
feelings," although no particular person or relationship is mentioned
(Gilligan, 1982:160-1).
It is possible to see how
such different vantage points entail different critical experiences in the
developmental paths of each sex. Despite the fact that the nature of the
dilemmas inherent in such critical experiences may be the same for both sexes –
for instance, a conflict between integrity and care – each sex is likely to
approach the developmental transitions with a different perspective. For males,
intimacy will in all probability be a primary transformative experience in the
transition from adolescence to adulthood. For women, the parallel is not
intimacy but the experience of choice that creates an encounter with self through
which the understanding of responsibility and truth becomes clarified
(Gilligan, 1982:164). Perhaps the most important point that Gilligan makes
concerns the possibility and necessity of alternate models of moral and
psychological development. Rather than presupposing a universal model of
psychological development based on hierarchical stages of separation and
individuation (for example see Levinson, 1978; or Mahler, Pine and Bergman,
1975) it may be more appropriate to frame an additional model based on stages
of increasing complexity or extension in the web-like nature of responsibility
and relationship. For example, it is possible to conceive of the development of
identity as a process of incorporation. In such a view, a particular
ego/identity develops through stages of the incorporation of the cognized
environment. In this way, the increasing differentiation of the lifeworld (as cognized environment)
reflects the increasing differentiation of the ego/identity as a complex whole
consisting of many "parts."
Gilligan's elaboration of
two perceptual orientations contextualizing moral and developmental knowledge
can be eloquently summarized in the following statement:
... men
and women may speak different languages that they assume are the same, using similar
words to encode disparate experiences of self and social relationships. Because
these languages share an overlapping moral vocabulary, they contain a
propensity for systematic mistranslation, creating misunderstandings which
impede communication and limit the potential for cooperation and care in
relationships. ... however, these languages articulate with one another in
critical ways. Just as the language of responsibilities provides a web-like
imagery of relationships to replace a hierarchical ordering that dissolves with
the coming of equality, so the language of rights underlines the importance of
including in the network of care not only the other but also the self
(Gilligan, 1982:173).
Gilligan's work presents a clear depiction of a structurally based phenomenology as it is shaped within a particular culture. The two voices which Gilligan presents are isomorphic with the perceptual orientations elaborated in our thesis. That is, the male's perceptual orientation toward a differentiation-from-environment/context is consistent with Gilligan's hearing of the male voice as one of abstraction, separation and individuation. In the same way the female's perceptual orientation toward identification-with-environment/context is consistent with a female voice that is narrative, contextual and centered on care and responsibility.
However, Gilligan posits
a neo-Freudian theoretical foundation (Chodorow, 1978) upon which to base the
differences in perceptual orientation and subsequent "language." This
theoretical foundation is not only consistent with but is encompassed by the
thesis elaborated in the previous chapter. We agree with Chodorow's description
of the psychodynamics between primary caregivers and infants, and the
subsequent necessity to involve males in early child care. However, the
understanding of different perceptual orientations recognizes that the
differences in the experiences of males and females are founded on the
structural and ontologic differences between them.
The perceptual and
cognitive orientation of the male can be represented in the equation: differentiation-from-environment/context=separation=individuation.
This equation is in turn congruent with the formula stated
previously:
mother = lifeworld, mother ≠ father, father = cogito.
The complementary perceptual and cognitive orientation of the
female can be represented with the equation:
connection = identity-with-environment/context = lifeworld = responsibility/choice.
∞ ⃝ ∞
The cognitive structures
(whether complex or simple) responsible for the establishment of culturally
specific sex-relations can be summarized as:
…a
product of neurobiological structures and processes that obtain at a deeper
level in the organism's biogram, on the one hand, and a product of the range
and intensity of environmental stimuli that are perceived as significant by the
organism, on the other hand (Laughlin, and Brady, 1978:2).
The important point to take note of is the perceptual orientation specific to each sex in the determination of what is considered significant. Furthermore, the positions of the actors within a particular social infrastructure are generally predicated on some sort of combination of factors influencing the rights of access to basic resources, and based on the shared physical, cognitive and social space. While functional integration of these positions is promoted by the sexual division of labour, the demands of incest taboos and exogamy as well as the obligations involved in exchange relations, the scope and intensity of such positions can vary in response to a host of environmental and cultural influences. Additionally the positions of these actors are subject to changes over time as information pools and contributions also change (Laughlin and Brady, 1978:11).
To put it more simply, we
can posit that certain environments (and social organizations and demographics
made possible therein) may tend to favour or require for the survival and
welfare of the inhabitants, particular categories of activities. Such
activities may in turn be relationally isomorphic with one or the other of the
sex-centered perceptual orientations outlined previously. In this way the
subsequent cognized environment may seem naturally to order egalitarian or
non-egalitarian relationships between the sexes. By egalitarian we mean a type
of inter-dependence and balance, a sort of sexual symmetry or integration. By
non-egalitarian we mean a more radical asymmetry and segregation in the
relational roles between the sexes (Sanday, 1981:170-1).
Sanday (1981:33) has found that a significant predictor of
sex-role behaviour within a particular culture is the creation symbolism
represented within its origin myth. Despite diversity of content three
consistent themes are regularly present in creation stories:
- A description of a creative agent;
- An implicit or explicit designation of the agent's origin; and
- An account of the agent's method of creation (Sanday, 1981:57).
- Female creators, generally originating from within something (i.e. water or earth) and create from their own bodies;
- Male, animal and supreme being creators who originate from without (i.e. the sky or another land) and create magically; and
- Couple creators originating from both within and without, and tend to create by natural reproductive processes.
The orientation of a
particular culture around particular creation symbolisms can be traced to the
way the people interact with their environment (Sanday, 1981:65). Both the
nature of the environment and the types of activity patterns necessary to
maintain the economic infrastructure are key influences in the genesis of
origin mythology. The workings of these influences are perhaps most evident in
non-industrial societies where the people are closer to the complex web of
natural phenomena.
For instance, Sanday
(1981:68) posits that if the environment is predominantly a source of danger
(i.e. in the form of large animals) inducing a relative sense of vulnerability,
then an outer or animal orientation (measurable in such terms as the distance
of males from infants and in beliefs about outer power) is likely to occur with
a subsequent male origin symbolism. On the other hand, if the environment is
perceived as beneficent, its lushness providing a sense of security and food is
derived from the earth, then there is likely to be an inner orientation
(measurable in terms such as greater male involvement with the young and
beliefs about inward power) and a subsequent female origin symbolism (Sanday,
1981:68).
Sanday's conceptions of
outer and inner orientations are consistent with the sex-specific perceptual
orientations elaborated in chapter three. For example, a hostile environment is
more likely to put a greater emphasis on the adaptive cognitive functions of
compartmentalization, replacement, and hierarchical social structuring
(Laughlin and Brady, 1978). These cognitive patterns tend to be more isomorphic
with the male processes underlying the perceptual orientation characterized as
"differentiating-from-context"
in the previous chapter.
Accordingly, the
relations between the sexes are less likely to be egalitarian. That is, through
the cognitive formula of Womb=Women=World and the perceptual
identification of the female with the environment, the relationship of the
culture with the environment presents perceptual and cognitive parameters for
an isomorphic relationship between the sexes. Thus, if the environment is
perceived as dangerous, then by association females are more likely to be
considered as dangerous by males. An evoked desire for the control or
domination of the environment is likely to evoke an isomorphic desire by males
to control or dominate females.
Migration as well as
technological complexity, also tend to favour sex relations that are
non-egalitarian as the underlying perceptual associations would be much the
same. However, if a culture maintains female creation/origin symbolism then it
is more likely to resist a shift from egalitarian relations between the sexes.
The metaphors inherent in the female creation symbolism provide a basis upon
which to organize the cognitive environment during social disruption (Sanday,
1981:133).
Cultures with a long and
stable association with one environment tend to have egalitarian relations
between the sexes. In these cultures, as in the majority of foraging and
fishing societies, women tend to wield secular as well as religious power and
economic and political authority. In such conditions there is likely to be an
inner orientation toward the perceived sources of power (Sanday, 1981:5). The
perceptual or cognitive associations of the environment, with an "inner
orientation," and the defining female processes described in Chapter Three
as "identity-with-environment"
are likely to establish relationships between males and females that are
isomorphic with the relationship between the culture and the environment. In
this way the interdependence and balance of the relational positions between
the sexes act out the interdependence and balance of the relationship between
the culture and environment.
While a comprehensive
elaboration of the dynamic interplay between the perceptual/cognitive
orientations and cultural, environmental, interpersonal variables would require
its own volume. We hope the brief sketch outlined above is sufficient to
provide an understanding of explanatory usefulness of the theoretical
perspective developed within this work.
Chapter Five – Conclusions and Implications
In Chapter One we stated
that the purpose of this study was an elaboration of a useful theoretical frame
within which the study of some aspects of sex differences and similarities, as
well as the social construction of gender, can be carried out. The present
controversy concerning the nature of the possible differences between the sexes
has generally been conceived in dualistic terms. Chief among the many polarized
conceptualizations of this controversy is the contemporary emphasis on the
social construction of gender in opposition to (and reaction against) notions
of biological determination. While this emphasis is not misplaced in relation
to the analysis of gender categories, it does tend to obfuscate the complex
involvement of the biology of sex dimorphism as the basic parameters by which
genders are socially constructed. Thus, the problem centers on an understanding
of how the biological referents of the differences between the sexes can be
acknowledged as a foundation upon which gender is socially constructed while at
the same time not as a foundation upon which absolute behavioral prescriptions
can be made. The thesis developed in this study was argued to present a
theoretical solution to this sort of controversy by unifying both the
dimensions of biological processes and social constructions within a single
view.The first step in the elaboration was an outlining of some of the problems within the present epistemological and language frameworks. A summary of the theory of autopoiesis was offered primarily as a powerful epistemological framework able to explore at many levels (i.e. cellular, organismic, or species), the link between biological structure and ontology and a consequential phenomenology. Autopoietic theory was considered a particularly apt framework for an understanding of both the differences between the sexes as experienced at an individual level or of the interaction of the sexes as components of a single species. This thesis posited sex-specific differences in perceptual orientation, based on some structurally and ontologically different processes and the associated phenomenology.
In Chapter Two an
evolutionary context was articulated. This context allowed us to frame some
relevant parameters of the human biogram in terms of some of the unique systems
serving the sexual dimorphism inherent in this species. Also elaborated were
some of the implications experienced by individual (regardless of sex), of this
particular species serving dimorphism.
Chapter Three presented
an outline of some of the structural and ontological processes unique to each
sex. It was hypothesized that the processes corresponding to many of the
sex-specific developmental (structural and ontological) transitions were
patterned on a relatively isomorphic basis. That is, as a meta-level pattern of
organizing information guiding structural and ontological development and
simultaneous perceptually experienced.
The female
developmental process was characterized by a consequent perceptual orientation
of an identification-with-environment/context.
The male
developmental process on the other hand was characterized by a consequent
perceptual orientation of a differentiation-from-environment/context.
In Chapter Four, evidence
supporting the existence of these sex-specific perceptual orientations was presented
through the work of Carol Gilligan (1982). Gilligan's findings, concerning the
need for two models of moral and psychological development corresponding to
each sex, were briefly summarized and integrated into the theoretical framework
of this thesis. Males were found to approach moral problems in terms of an
ethic of individual rights, autonomy and non-interference stressing a formal
and abstract mode of thinking. Females tended to approach moral problems in
terms of an ethic of responsibility, relationship and care stressing a
narrative and contextual mode of thinking.
Correspondingly the model
of psychological development positing hierarchical stages of separation and
individuation was found more accurately to describe male developmental experience.
Gilligan suggested an alternative model of psychological development framed in
terms of stages of increasing complexity or extension in the awareness of the
web-like nature of responsibility and relationship.
The chapter concluded
with a brief analysis of a few of the possible interaction between the
sex-specific perceptual orientations and certain environmental contingencies.
It was posited that: (1) these perceptual orientations were the basis for a
gendered descriptive and symbolic language used to render the world
recognizable; (2) in turn the recognition of the environment would be
instrumental in the formulation of culturally specific egalitarian or
non-egalitarian relations between the sexes.
The study has had to
confront a number of limitations. Chief among these limitations has been in the
nature of available time and space. Subsequently, there is a considerable
amount and scope of material that was not able to be covered. We have not dealt
with a vast quantity of literature concerning some of the traditionally
researched sex differences in behavior. For example, differences in speech or
visual-spatial ability, aggression, passivity etc.. Additionally, we have not
examined overt or covert sexuality or sexual behavior, except to make the point
that sexuality is an individual expression of the complex relationship between
personal, familial and cultural experiences and one's sex. Also not dealt with
were the substantial proportions of similarities between the sexes. Neither
have we dealt with the structural and ontologic transformations occurring in
later life.
However, on the basis of
the lines of evidence presented we can conclude that there are inherent
sex-specific perceptual orientations arising out of different male and female
structural and ontological processes and their associated phenomenology. We can
also conclude that sex-specific perceptual orientations are influential in the
recognition of environmental contingencies and in this way contribute in the
formulation of culturally specific relations between the sexes. Thus, we are
able to accept and refine the definition of gender offered in Chapter One.
Thus from two sexes are born the potential for
multiple gender categories and innumerable sexualities or varieties of sexual
behaviour. Genders emerge as socially constructed categories consisting
of combinations of components of behavior perceived as isomorphic or at least
consistent with the sex-specific perceptual orientations. Within this
definition lies the substance of an epistemology of gender.
The concept of
differences in the perceptual orientation of each sex is capable of making some
significant contributions to the explanation of many of the observed
differences in the expectations and roles occurring between the sexes. However,
it must be stressed that these different perceptual orientations provide no
basis for the prescription of roles or behavior.
The overwhelming
similarities between humans, including a complex behavioral and
neuro-structural architecture (biogram) which integrates reproductive and
non-reproductive phase specific systems, provides substantial ground for
asserting the generalization that every individual member of the species has
access to the whole behavioral repertoire of the species. By stressing the primacy
of perception as a basis for fundamental differences between the sexes we are
able to acknowledge the influence of biological processes in shaping initial
and inherent perceptual orientation. However, potential behavioral capabilities
cannot be determined or prescribed since identical behaviors can be produced by
a variety of different structural and organizational processes.
The implications of
sex-specific perceptual orientations based on correspondingly different
structural and ontological processes are numerous, multi-leveled and
far-reaching. The sex-specific perceptual orientations are fundamental
components out of which culturally created symbolic templates arise. Conceived
in this way, these perceptual orientations can become powerful analytic tools
to further the understanding of the dynamics behind a spectrum of
cross-cultural and trans-cultural phenomena. For example, a cross-cultural
re-examination of the rites of passage and initiation of both sexes from a
perspective of the epistemology of gender elaborated here contribute to an
understanding of their psychological importance.
The importance of such
rites may lie in their provision of appropriate psychic, affective and symbolic
contexts for the cognitive integration of the unfolding perceptual experiences
inherent in the phenomenology associated with individual structural and
ontological development. The timing of appropriate cultural events with the
sex-specific ontology may facilitate the individual to orient toward the
"self," the "other" and the cultural context. Thus, an
important implication of sex-specific perceptual orientations lies in their
potential to contribute to a foundation upon which to organize educational and
personal development. For example, the optimization of the flexibility of one's
cognized environment can be facilitated through the utilization of the concept
(and techniques therein) of a "symbolic penetration" (Webber, 1980)
in relation to the perceptual orientation embodied in one's own and the other
sex.
The comprehension of the
sex-specific perceptual orientations and subsequent epistemology of gender
potentially provides a base from which the facilitation of greater intra- and
inter-sex communication and understanding can take place. An ability to
acknowledge sex differences that are not prescriptive of behavioral
capabilities can facilitate the "tuning into" the voice and language
differences inherent in different perceptual orientations. In this way, the
sexes are less likely to become "separated by a common language."
The use of these
sex-specific perceptual orientations to examine and analyse the tremendous
variety of sexual behavior, both within our own culture as well as
cross-culturally, may prove extremely useful. "Sexuality," which can
be considered as related to but distinct from "sexual behavior," may
also be subjected to useful analysis with the use of the perceptual
orientations. Despite varieties of sexual preference there may be similar
perceptual/cognitive dynamics involved in the evocation of arousal states. An
enumeration of all the potential implication of sex-specific perceptual
orientations is not possible but it is appropriate to outline some areas of
further research.
Besides the research
required to explore the implications already stated, a more comprehensive and
exhaustive elaboration of the sex-specific structural and ontological processes
is necessary. Equally important is a more detailed elaboration of the dynamic
interactions between the structural and ontologic processes and the web of
environmental contingencies. Both elaborations will assist in establishing the
complex network of specific processes influencing the organization of a
gendered cognized environment. Important to include in future research is the
potential contribution of this epistemology of gender towards: 1) the
delineation of individual sexuality, and 2) the situating of those individuals
who stand out as exceptions (physiologically and psychologically) to
"normal" male and female development.
[1]The
use of the term "polymorphous pleasure" is an obvious derivative of
Freud's well known descriptive phrase for infant sexuality, "polymorphous
perversity". I intentionally use the word pleasure rather than perversity
to shift the framing of sexuality to a more positive light and to avoid the
assumption that human nature is somehow innately predisposed to the pursuit of
"uncivilized" sensations. Furthermore the emphasis of pleasure allows
the assumption that the many forms that sexuality can take are at some level
motivated by an experience of pleasure, which in turn places the functioning of
sexuality more on the level of the individual rather than on the level of the
species.
[2]This remains true of the instinctual aims and objects on the psychological (the phenomenology emerging from the organisms structure) level as well.
[2]This remains true of the instinctual aims and objects on the psychological (the phenomenology emerging from the organisms structure) level as well.
[3]The ability to communicate and think in terms of negatives, for instance, communicating what is not occurring "This is not a game" or what is not desired "I don't want the chocolate cake", is perhaps uniquely human (Bateson, 1972).
[4]Symbolopoesis and phasia are the prerequisites to the capacity to communicate in terms of negatives which as previously mentioned may be a uniquely human process.
[5]The ubiquity of contingencies of relationship, as a "communicational or representational unit" is evident even in the contractual nature of our concept of justice. The "contract" provides a "security" or stability to the relationship of an individual to a group, a society, another individual, etc.
[6]Indeed although, the distinction between oestrus and menstrual cycle has been made, the elaboration and implications of the differences between these two types of reproductive cycles is strangely missing from a great deal of the literature.
[7]Count speaks of this concept in terms of the survival of ingredients from the mass of behaviour that was mobilized around the lactation process. However, it remains a useful descriptive term for the sequential or simultaneous incompatibility of multiple statuses in one individual while transacting with another individual also holding multiple statuses.
[8]By male is intended a biological integrity in morphology and not any psycho-social aspect associated with that particular body. Throughout this work maleness is not to be equated with masculinity.
[9]The choice of the descriptive terms "identifying-with-environment" and "differentiation-from-environment" are admittedly evocative at the least. However, in considering the great amount of controversy surrounding the subject of sex and gender the terms do permit an adequate descriptive power while not euphemistically evaporating the potency of the controversy.
[11]A great deal of controversy exists over the use and meanings of the terms penis and phallus. The term phallus has been chosen here as it more adequately represents the multivalent and transpersonal functioning of the systemic structures involved and consequent phenomenology therein. While penis may be descriptive of an anatomical and personal organ, Phallus seems a better term for the functioning and impersonal "being" evident in the not uncommon attribution of pet names such as "Mr. Happy" or "The Wonder Weasel" (Robbin Williams, various movies).
[12]For instance there is evidence that the particular interaction between an individual female and her ideological orientation toward either or both of the poles of her menstrual cycle may influence the onset and type of PMS suffered (Shuttle and Redgrove, 1978:40). Other evidence indicates that both the orientation of the female's sexual initiative and the thematic nature of her dreams experience a cyclic shifting in conjunction with her menstrual cycle (Shuttle and Redgrove, 1978:101).
[13]The term biological should be understood in this instance in a very narrow sense. It is presumed that by biological is implied an orientation opposing the body with the mind. A more useful analytical concept can be found in the autopoietic notion of structure. In this way the symbolic/phenomenological emergents can be more easily associated and integrated with structural and ontologic transformations.
[14]It is perhaps inappropriate to discount passion per se, from the roles that are served. It may be that to the author, the term passion is used to indicate a conception of the affections involved with sexuality. If so, the phenomenology resultant from the interaction of the male's individual structural functioning and the structural functioning involved with the higher order of autopoietic organization of which the male is only one component, may be the source of the so called passion. Subsequently, passion should be considered much more complex and integrally involved in the meanings and goals served by the phallus. For a more complete elaboration of "passion" see Johnson, 1983.
[15]This is a term used by Victor Turner (1967:5052).
[16]It must be kept in mind that the Jungian understanding of the body expressed here is somewhat different than the understanding being developed in this work. The body in Neumann's sense is associated with matter and thus with nature and the lifeworld. This view is essentially valid and is not inconsistent with the view being developed in this work.
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